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The Supreme Court
and State Power to Deal
with Subversion and Loyaltyt
In this Article, Professor Cramton discusses the effect of re-
cent United States Supreme Court decisions on state control
of Subversive activities. He finds that while the decisions to
some extent restrict state activity in this area, and though
the Court in its decisions gives the impression of vacillation
and confusion, some definite an dworkable principles are
emerging which contribute to a resolution of the inherent
conflict of federal-state relations which these issues pose. He
concludes that as the states grow more sophisticated in their
treatment of these issues, so the policy of judicial self-
restraint will become more influential in restricting Supreme
Court examination of state policy and activities toward
these questions.
Roger C. Cramton*
SINCE the end of World War II, issues of subversion
and loyalty have been more important in the work of the Supreme
Court-than at any other time in American history. It was inevitable
that the national preoccupation with the loyalty of citizens as well
as noncitizens ultimately would be reflected in constitutional con-
troversies before the Court. Perhaps it was also inevitable that de-
cision of these matters would itself involve the Court in another of
those intermittent crises which have marked constitutional develop-
ment in the United States.
The intensity of this latest crisis is partially explained by the
novelty and complexity of the constitutional questions presented
for decision. It was only natural that a nation confident of its
extemal security and preoccupied with its own expansion and de-
IAn earlier draft of a portion of this Article was prepared as a basis for dis-
cussion at a seminar to have been attended by a committee of the Conference of
Chief Justices and members of the faculty of the University of Chicago Law
School
, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law SchooL
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velopment would remain unconcerned with the loyalty of its citi-
zens.' The discovery, after World War II, that our comfortable
isolation from the perils of physical assault had come to an end
came as a great shock. The sudden realization of vulnerability,
coupled with fear of this unknown experience, produced a rash of
defensive measures for which earlier experience provided little
counterpart. The coercive impact of many of these measures
clashed with our traditions of individual liberty and free dissent
without finding support in an indigenous American theory of an
organic, personalized State. The absence of a body of constitutional
principles clearly applying to these novel circumstances increased
the difficulties of the Court and insured criticism whatever action
it took.2
Other factors, however, contributed to the current controversy.
Although the existence of a communist threat to our national se-
curity was widely recognized, there was no substantial unanimity
of public opinion concerning the magnitude of the threat or the
action required to meet it. Since existing constitutional doctrine
required a balancing of the "rights" of individuals and the govern-
mental interest in security, conflicting evaluations of the com-
munist menace were relevant to the Court's task.3 Nevertheless,
expression in decisions of the Court's views of the seriousness of
the situation irritated those who, at any time, assessed the problem
differently.' Finally, concern with the Court's decisions with re-
spect to subversion has been reinforced by other controversies in
which the Court is involved. The creative expansion of four-
teenth amendment rights by the Warren Court,5 the uproar over
1. The relative scarcity of treason prosecutions illustrates the point. Despite
the fact that the United States had been involved in many wars, Professor Hurst
could still say in 1945: "There have been less than two score treason prosecutions
pressed to trial by the Federal government; there has' been no execution on a fed-
eral treason conviction; and the Executive has commonly intervened to pardon, or
at least mitigate the sentence of those convicted." Hurst, Treason in the United
States, 58 I-ARv. L. REv. 806 (1945).
2. This argument is spelled out in Swismm, Tim SurME: COUnT IN Tim MODERN
ROLE 66-70, 101-03 (1958).
3. The clear and present danger test, for example, requires an explicit evaluation
of the substantiality of the threatened harm. See discussion of the doctrine in the
various opinions filed in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
4. Nor was the Court necessarily consistent in its evaluation or in agreement
within the Court. Compare Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1957)
(majority opinion of Black, J.), and Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118,
131-59 (1943) (opinion of Murphy, J.), with Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951) (opinion of Vinson, C.J.), and American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 422-33 (1950) (separate opinion of Jackson, J.). The various
opinions in each of these cases, with the exception of Konigsberg, reveal a difference
of opinion among members of the Court.
5. The increased concern with state criminal procedures is excellently summarized
in Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice,
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the School Segregation Cases,6 and the continuing discussion as to
whether the Supreme Court has not unduly enlarged federal power
at the expense of the states7 have been the major focal points.
In recent months criticism of the Court's performance in deciding
issues relating to subversion and loyalty has come from two re-
sponsible sources. In August 1958 the Conference of Chief Justices
admonished the Supreme Court to exercise judicial restraint and
approved a report of its Committee on Federal-State Relationships
as Affected by Judicial Decisions." Nearly one-fourth of the thirty-
one page report was devoted to a critical examination of Supreme
Court decisions restricting state power to deal with issues of sub-
version and loyalty. In February 1959 the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association approved resolutions which called
for congressional reversal of a half-dozen Supreme Court decisions
involving subversion.9 Although the resolutions opposed any at-
tempt to limit the jurisdiction of the Court and avoided direct
criticism of the Court, they stated that the decisions "have been
severely criticized and deemed unsound by many responsible
authorities" and that legislative reversal was needed "so as to re-
move any doubt as to the intent of the Congress, and to remedy any
defect in the existing law revealed by the decisions." 10 The impli-
cation of the resolutions, which was made explicit in the committee
report which accompanied them, was that the Court had misin-
terpreted the Constitution, misread the intent of Congress, and
given aid to the communist movement."
8 U. Cm. L. SCH.REc. 3 (Spec. Supp. 1958). See also Schaefer, Federalism and
State Crimina Procedure, 70 Htnv. L. REv. 1 (1956).
6. See Fairman, The Attaclk on the Segregation Cases, 70 Hanv. L. Rxv. 83
(1956); Pollak, The Supreme Court Under Fire, 6 J. Pun. L. 428, 434-48 (1957).
7. KIu.ATEI:co THE SOVERIGN STATES (1957); see Scmmi=usmt, Tnm SuPRnmE
CouRT As FiA.. AnBnrER N FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS, 1789-1957 (1958).
8. CoNzmnEcE OF CH EF JusrucEs, REPOR or -Tm Co.ITm-za ON FEDERAL-
STATE REPATIoNsHms As AFFECrED BY JUDiCIAL DEcisIONs (Chicago 1958). The
report is reprinted in U. S. News & World Report, Aug. 29, 1958, p. 62. It is
also available from the Conference of Chief Justices, 1313 E. 60th St., Chicago 37,
Illinois, $1.00.
9. AmncmA_ BAR AssocrAToN, RESOLUONS OF Tim SRpmciA Coiaunmn ON
CoN -mnr TAcacs, STA'ry AND OBjEcnvES (1959). The text of the resolu-
tions and a portion of the debate which preceded their approval are reprinted in
45 A.B.A.J. 360, 365, 400, 406-10 (1959). The decisions that would be re-
versed include Yates v. United States, 854 U.S. 298 (1957); Watkins v. United
States, 854 U.S. 178 (1957); United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957); Cole
v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 850 U.S. 497 (1956).
10. 45 AB.A_.J. 360, 408 (1959).
11. See Amc BAR AssocIAoN, RE:OT or Tim SPEcIAL Con MU-T ON
ComwrfsN TAccc, STRATEGY AN OBjECIVES (1959). The President of the
Association has pointed out that the adoption of the resolutions did not constitute
an endorsement of the Report of the Special Committee and has argued, somewhat
apologetically, that the resolutions do not criticize the Supreme Court. Malone,
The Communist Resolutions: What the House of Delegates Really Did, 45 A.B.A.J.
19591 1027
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This Article will consider, in the light of the current controversy
surrounding the Supreme Court, the development in recent years
of constitutional limitations on state power to deal with issues of
subversion and loyalty. The more numerous decisions involving
federal legislation dealing with communist subversion will be dis-
cussed only where necessary to illuminate problems arising with
respect to similar state legislation. Attention is centered on the de-
cisions involving state power for reasons largely of convenience in
exposition and summary. Nevertheless, there are several reasons for
examining separately these cases. First, the story of the Court's
review of federal action in this field has been retold many times."2
Second, although the Court has talked a great deal about first
amendment and fifth amendment limitations on federal power, the
cases, with several exceptions, either affirm federal power or resolve
particular issues adversely to the federal government as a matter of
statutory construction, or on relatively narrow procedural grounds.138
343 (1959). The debate in the House of Delegates, however, reveals that many of
the delegates, including both supporters and opponents of the resolutions, thought
that the resolutions were directed at the Supreme Court. For example, Loyd
Wright, a past President of the Association and a supporter of the resolutions,
stated: "Isnt it time we stood up and told the American people that we will not
stand for subversion? Isn't it time that we ask the Court to read the law and inter-
ret the law and quit writing ideological opinions? . . . " 45 A.B.A.J. 360, 406
1959).
12. Full citation to the tremendous literature on the subject may be found in 1
EmERsoN & Ha, Por.cAL ADsw Cr. Racrrs iN Tim UNmTED STATES 315-10,
333-38, 371, 390, 413-14, 425-28, 447, 520-21, 528, 535, 553-55 (2d ed. 1958).
13. The major decisions in which federal power has been upheld against con-
stitutional attack include Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (upholding de-
portation of alien for past membership in the Communist Party); Ilarisindes v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (upholding deportation of aliens for past beliefs
or actions); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding a prosecution
under the Smith Act); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382
(1950) (upholding Taft-Hartley requirement of oath of union officials as a con-
dition of union's obtaining rights under the Act); United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (upholding plenary power to exclude aliens).
Among the numerous decisions construing federal statutes adversely to the Covern-
ment are: Greene v. McElroy, 79 S. Ct. 1400 (1959) (federal government's industrial
security program for government contractors not specifically authorized by
Congress); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (Secretary of State does not
have statutory authority to deny passports to Communists); Bonetti v. Rogers, 350
U.S. 691 (1958) (Immigration and Nationality Act does not provide for deporta-
tion of an alien who has not been a member of the Communist Party since his
last entry); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (Smith Act does not
prohibit the teaching and advocacy of the violent overthrow of the United States
Government as an abstract doctrine); United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194
(1957) (power of Attorney General to ask questions of alien against whom a de-
portation order has been outstanding for more than six months limited to questions
related to availability for departure); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956) (sum-
mary suspension of federal employees authorized only for employees in "sensitive"
positions).
Some of the major cases turning on procedural points are: Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359
U.S. 535 (1959) (discharge of federal employee on security grounds invalid because
1028
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Finally, the cases reviewing state power in this field reveal most
clearly the continuing struggle of libertarian ideals with federalist
principles. At times libertarian victories have produced novel and
creative constitutional doctrine. But a resurgence of federalist con-
cepts, combined with less spacious views of the proper scope of
judicial review, has in most instances revived state power and cast
doubt on the precedent value of the earlier decisions upholding
individual freedom against state action.
If the states had been content to leave matters of communist
subversion to the federal government, the constitutional problems
of subversion and loyalty in the states would never have arisen. For
better or for worse, the political and legislative issues were settled
at an early date in favor of state participation. A number of state
legislatures embarked on ambitious programs of legislative investi-
gation in order to discover and expose disloyal or subversive persons
and organizations;14 and a steady stream of legislation dealing
with every phase of "subversion" has poured from state capitols.1 5
It is arguable that, given the extensive federal legislation and
of failure to comply with departmental regulations); Flaxer v. United States,
358 U.S. 147 (1958) (reversal of conviction for contempt of Congress on ground
that witness was given ten days from date named in indictment within which to
comply); Yates v. United States, 855 U.S. 66 (1957) (reversal for duplication
of concurrent convictions for contempt of court); Jencc v. United States, 353 U.S.
657 (1957) (reversal of conviction for filing a false noncommunist affidavit be-
cause of denial of defendant's motion for production of reports made to the FBI
by government witnesses who testified at the trial); Gold v. United States, 352 U.S.
985 (1957) (per curiam) (reversal of conviction for filing a false noncommunist
affidavit because of FBI contact with jury during course of trial); Communist Party
v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115 (1956) (reversal of registration
proceeding because of allegations of perjury).
14. The operation of state legislative investigating committees is described in
BAP uwrr, THE TENNEY Co-n m LEGrSLA-I INVES n oN OF SumvmisrvE
Aarrvrrrzs 3N CAL FoanA (1951); Ca~mBEA 32arq, LoYALTY AN LEamiTrvE Ac-
nom: A SuavEY OF AcrrvrrY By =m NEw Yonx STATE LE=tsLArunn, 1919-1949
(1951); CoumT tmA_, Ur-AMRmCAN AcTrvrrms nr m STATE OF WASHiNcGTox
(1951); GvS iOmr, Tum STATES AND SuBvEmsioN (1952).
15. The state legislation as of 1955 is described in plentiful detail in Fu.%D FoR
=m REPumic, Dic sr or Tm Putrsc Rncoiu or Co c r.utNm n rim UN=D
STATES 241-488 (1955) (hereinafter cited as DiGEsT). Existing laws prohibiting
treason, insurrection, sabotage, sedition and the like have been refurbished and
expanded. Communists and subversives have been excluded from public office and
.denied the right to vote. Loyalty oaths have been widely required not only of
elected officials and public employees, but of other groups as well, particularly
lawyers and teachers. Comprehensive registration statutes have required organiza-
tions or persons defined as "subversive" to register with state authorities. Disabil-
ities have been imposed on those who register, while a failure to register subjects
the alleged "subversive" to criminal penalties. In some states the Communist Party
has been made an unlawful organization; nearly everywhere substantial disabilities
have been imposed on communists. Among the various privileges and benefits which
have been denied to "subversives" are jury service, public housing, tax exemption
and welfare benefits. And, finally, many municipalities have thought it necessary
to duplicate the federal and state legislation with local ordinances covering the
same ground.
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enforcement, much of this state legislation was unwise and that
the need for action on the part of the states would have been satis-
fied by full co-operation with the federal authorities. Certainly
most of the state legislation has proved ineffective. A mere hand-
ful of admitted communists have been prosecuted in state courts
for sedition or similar crimes.'" The Communist Party has been de-
prived of the somewhat dubious opportunity of capturing the vote
of the common man. The state registration schemes have been en-
tirely inoperative. Throughout the entire country only one indi-
vidual is reported to have registered, and despite the lack of
registrants, no prosecutions for failure to register have been
brought. 7 Only the loyalty oath requirements have proved to be
of much consequence. Under their authority, a substantial number
of persons, including some communists, have been removed from
public employment (including such sensitive positions as subway
conductingl) and from professions such as teaching and law. Here
again, it is arguable that this has been accomplished only at a
disproportionate cost in terms of a climate of public opinion unfa-
vorable to the free expression of political views.'" But these are
matters for legislative judgment; this Article is concerned primarily
with the judicial and constitutional issues relating to state power
over matters of subversion.
At the outset the distribution between the states and the federal
government of power to deal with matters of subversion and loyalty
will be briefly canvassed. The salient event here is the displacement
of state authority by Pennsylvania v. Nelson,"9 and the scope and
effect of that decision will be considered in Part I. In Part II the
developing constitutional limitations on legislative investigation of
subversive activity will be summarized. Part III will be concerned
with the evolution of novel procedural and substantive limitations
on state power to impose civil disqualifications for subversive
thoughts or conduct. Although the law remains in a state of evolv-
ing uncertainty, an attempt will be made in Part IV to summarize
the emerging constitutional principles and to evaluate the Supreme
Court's performance.
I. DISPLACEMENT OF STATE AuTroRury - Tin Nelson CASE
An essential feature of American federalism is that the states
continued, under the Constitution, to exercise general governmental
16. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 80 n.19, Pennsylvania v.
Nelson, 850 U.S. 497 (1956).
17. DIGEST, op. cit. supra note 15, at 884.
18. See BROWN, LOYALTY AND SECUIUTY 164-202 (1958), in which tho social
and legal implications of widespread use of loyalty tests for public and privato
employment are thoroughly discussed.
19. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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competence except to the extent that the Constitution or federal
statutes deprived them of competence or displaced state law. Fed-
eral law, which emanates from the Constitution and from Congress,
is built on and presupposes the existence of state law; it is the excep-
tion rather than the rule; and generally, even where federal power
to act is clear, the displacement of state law is thought to require
some special justification.20 Thus in the absence of an express con-
stitutional provision making the regulation of subversion an exclu-
sive national function, the states have concurrent legislative power.2 '
In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
earlier holding that the states have concurrent power with the
federal government to prescribe criminal penalties for sedition di-
rected against the United States.22 The significance of the case,
however, does not lie in what the Court said the states might do,
under other circumstances, but in what the Court said they might
not do under existing circumstances. For the Court, drawing on
the metaphorical tests for "occupation of the field" developed in
commerce clause cases, held that federal legislation regulating
communist activity had superseded to an uncertain extent the sedi-
tion statutes of the states. The Court effected this broad displace-
ment of state sedition laws without seriously considering the ap-
plicability of its comerce clause "tests of supersession" to a case in-
volving overlapping criminal statutes and a congressional saving
clause.
I have elsewhere suggested that the Court's "tests of superses-
sion" are so vague that judicial views of the desirability of the
particular state legislation under attack appear to control the out-
come; that the Court should consider whether its vague tests should
be extended to cases not involving the commerce power; and that
the Court misapplied its pre-emption doctrine in Pennsylvania v.
Nelson.23 For present purposes, however, I will assume that the
Court's pre-emption doctrine was properly applied in Nelson. The
20. See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLum. L. REv.
489 (1954).
21. whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 825 (1920). This conclusion is not self-
evident. Some of the federal war powers are exclusive federal responsibilities. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16, § 10, cl. 3. And although the states retain the
power of self-preservation to suppress insurrection and repel invasion, the duty
of preserving the state governments rests upon the federal government. Mr. Justice
Brandeis argued unsuccessfully in his dissenting opinion in Gilbert, 254 U.S. at
334-43, that penalties for interference with federal recruitment were within the
exclusive power of the federal government. Cf. People v. Lynch, 11 Johns. 549
(N.Y. 1814), and Ex parte Quarrier, 2 W. Va. 569 (1866), in which state treason
prosecutions were dismissed.
22. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
23. Cramton, Pennsylvania v. Nelson: A Case Study in Federal Pre-emption, 26 U.
Cm. L. Rrv. 85 (1958).
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concern here is with the effect of the Nelson case and subsequent
decisions on state power to punish and otherwise control subversive
activity.
The Nelson case holds that the states cannot punish sedition
directed against the United States Government, but declares that
they remain free to punish offenses involving a local breach of the
peace. Except at these extremes, the scope and effect of the de-
cision remain unclear. However, it is possible to speculate about the
probable effect of the decision on state criminal prosecutions for
other overlapping offenses, on state communist control measures, on
state loyalty-oath programs, and on state legislative investigations.
It seems probable that the Nelson case will be interpreted as
prohibiting any state sedition prosecution in which the evidence
also establishes an attempt to overthrow the federal government.
Several state courts have already so held.24 Although the seditious
conduct in the Nelson case was said to be directed solely against
the federal government, the reasoning of the Court is equally ap-
plicable to any case in which communist sedition is involved. The
Smith Act prohibits attempts to overthrow state or local govern-
ments as well as the federal government. 2 The nature of the com-
munist movement, when considered in connection with the
congressional declaration that the Communist Party is engaged in a
world-wide conspiracy to overthrow established government, 2
makes it unlikely that any case involving communist sedition would
not present an attack against federal as well as against state author-
ity. State activity in this area would appear to require evidence of
an actual or threatened local breach of the peace. If, for example,
a seditious speech resulted in a serious public disturbance, the state
could impose punishment, since the Nelson case does not "limit the
right of the State to protect itself at any time against sabotage or
attempted violence of all kinds." 2 And the decisive issue should
be whether there is evidence of a threat to a distinctive local
interest, such as maintenance of public order, and not the label
affixed to the indictment.
24. Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 334 Mass. 71, 134 N.E.2d 13 (1956) (dismissal
of prosecution under state criminal anarchy statute); Commonwealth v. Hood, 334
Mass. 76, 134 N.E.2d 12 (1956) (dismissal of prosecutions under state subversive
activities statute, charging membership in the Communist Party and contributions to
it); Braden v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956) (reversal of
conviction under state sedition act for conspiring to damage property to incite social
troubles; local breach of the peace clearly involved); State v. Jenkins, Crim. Dist.
Ct., New Orleans, La. (unreported decision dismissing,,a prosecution under the
Louisiana Subversive Activities Law for membership in a subversive organization').
See 3 Cry. LiB. Doc= 27 (1958).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).
26. 70 Stat. 899 (1956), 50 U.S.C. § 851 (Supp. IV 1957).
27. 350 U.S. at 500.
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Outside the sedition area, the Nelson decision will not prevent
all state prosecutions for an offense also punishable under federal
law, but it will require that some distinctive local interest be in-
volved. Both state and federal governments can continue to punish
such overlapping offenses as bank robbery,28 assault on a federal
officer,29 theft from a post office30 and the like, 31 since in each case
the criminal conduct inevitably involves a local breach of the peace.
It is probable, however, that state power to punish other overlap-
ping offenses, such as interference with federal recruitment,32 dese-
cration of the United States flag,33 impersonation of a federal officer
and the like, is no longer permissible absent a showing that a local
breach of the peace is involved. In each of the above instances the
sole purpose of state initiative is to aid the federal government in
maintaining respect for federal institutions. Although there is no
logical reason why the police power of a state should not encom-
pass the furthering of national purposes and unity, these matters
are of distinctive federal interest, and the existence of a federal
penalty may be thought to require a finding of pre-emption.
A number of states have comprehensive communist control meas-
28. See Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943); In re Morgan, 80 F.
Supp. 810 (N.D. Iowa 1948); People v. Candelaria, 189 Cal, App. 2d 482, 294 P.
2a 120 (1956); State v. Cioffe, 130 N.J.L. 160, 32 A.2d 79 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
See also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (no pre-emption question sug-
gested as barring state prosecution for bank robbery after an acquittal in a federal
trial for same acts).
29. See Brooke v. State, 155 Ala. 78, 46 So. 491 (1908) (assault and battery in
post office).
80. Quinn v. State, 89 Ala. App. 107, 95 So. 2d 273 (1957). Cases preceding
the Nelson decision include United States v. Amy, 24 Fed. Cas. 792 (No. 14,445)
(C.C. Va. 1859) (dictum) (Taney, C.J.); State v. Moore, 143 Iowa 240, 241-42,
121 N.W. 1052, 1053 (1909); Commonwealth v. Ponzi, 256 Mass. 159, 152 N.E.
307 (1926); In re Van Dyke, 276 Mich. 32, 267 N.V. 778 (1936); People v.
Burke, 161 Mich. 897, 126 N.W. 446 (1910); Ex parte Groom, 87 Mont. 377, 381-
82, 287 Pac. 638, 639 (1930); State v. Stevens, 60 Mont. 390, 199 Pac. 256 (1921);
Hayner v. State, 83 Ohio St. 178, 93 N.E. 900 (1910); State v. Morrow, 40 S.C.
221, 18 S.E. 853 (1893); State v. Ferree, 88 W. Va. 434, 437, 107 S.E. 126, 127
(1921).
31. Pre-emption arguments based on the Nelson case have been rejected in the
following cases: Guerin v. State, 315 P.2d 965 (Nev. 1957) (narcotics); People v.
Knapp, 157 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1956) (labor extortion); People v. Bianchi,
3 Misc. 2d 696, 155 N.Y.S. 2d 703 (Nassau County Ct. 1956) (excessive motorboat
speed).
32. Although Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920), would appear to be
directly in point, it was distinguished in Nelson on the ground that Gilbert's re-
marks at a public meeting created a threat of disorder constituting a local breach of
the peace. The implication is that a state can no longer prosecute for interference
with federal recruitment absent facts giving rise to a local breach of the peace.
33. In People v. Von Rosen, 13 I1M. 2d 68, 147 N.E.2d 827 (1958), the Illinois
Supreme Court reversed a conviction under a state statute prohibiting desecration
of the United States flag because it was not shown that the conduct was likely to
produce a breach of the peace within the state. The basis for the holding was that
"Congress has left no room for the States to punish desecration qua desccration.
.. "Id. at 71, 147 N.E.2d at 329.
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ures resembling the federal Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950 and Communist Control Act of 1954.84 These statutes provide
for registration of communist and subversive organizations, set out
penalties for sabotage, and impose various disabilities upon regis-
trants, such as exclusion from the ballot and from public office.
Other states require registration but do not impose disabilities upon
registrants.' It is probable that most of the provisions of these
statutes have been superseded by federal legislation. The registra-
tion statutes duplicate and enlarge the federal registration scheme.
Nearly all of them differ from the federal scheme in one or more
respects. Some are accompanied by provisions outlawing the Com-
munist Party. Because of the probable conflict of provisions, there is
a much clearer case for pre-emption with reference to these statutes
than there is with respect to the sedition statutes invalidated by the
Nelson case. Hines v. Davidowitz," in which the Federal Alien
Registration Act of 1940 was held to supersede a Pennsylvania alien
registration statute, provides a close analogy. Moreover, the breadth
and thoroughness of the federal scheme make it easier to infer a
pre-emptive intent on the part of Congress.87 It is not surprising
that the Michigan Supreme Court in Albertson v. Attorney Gen-
eral,38 held that Michigan's comprehensive communist control law
had been superseded by the similar provisions of federal communist
control measures.
The effect of Nelson on other state measures dealing with com-
munist subversion89 is more difficult to predict. Relatively circum-
scribed measures concerned with the loyalty of public employees
or of occupational groups in which the state has a special regulatory
interest would appear to be unaffected by the Nelson case and thus
remain enforceable. The only direct authority thus far, a decision
of the Florida Supreme Court upholding the loyalty oath required
of Florida's state employees, 40 supports this conclusion. Persuasive
34. Alabama, Louisiana, Michigan, and Texas. The statutes are described in
DiGEsr, op. cit. supra note 15, at 383-402.
35. Arkansas, Delaware and New Mexico.
36. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
37. It should be noted that the Department of Justice, which opposed a finding
of pre-emption with respect to state sedition statutes, has indicated that state
communist control measures were governed by different considerations and were
probably invalid. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 38 n.24, Penn-
sylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
38. 345 Mich. 519, 77 N.W.2d 104 (1956). Prior to the Nelson case, a divided
three-judge federal district court had upheld the same statute. Albertson v. Millard,
106 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Mich. 1952), vacated on other grounds, 345 U.S. 242
(1953). See also Knox v. State, 38 Ala. App. 482, 87 So. 2d 671 (1956), where the
question of the validity of Alabama registration provisions was not reached.
39. See DxcEsT, op. cit. supra note 15, at 324-82, 410-34.
40. State v. Diez, 97 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1957). See also First Unitarian Church v.
Los Angeles, 48 Cal. 2d 419, 441, 311 P.2d 508, 522 (1957), rev'd on due process
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indirect authority may be found in the refusal of the Supreme
Court, on several occasions, to consider this question in reviewing
state decisions.41 The explanation lies in the vital interest which
the states have in controlling eligibility for public office and public
employment. No federal statutes deal directly with these matters
and federal power to do so is subject to question.
Serious problems are raised, however, by various state laws deny-
ing the use of election facilities, and other rights and privileges, to
the Communist Party and other subversive organizations. These
restrictions are in accord with federal policy -the Communist Con-
trol Act of 1954 declares that these organizations are not entitled
to any rights, privileges, or immunities granted by the states or by
the United States. 3 The state statutes may effect a greater or lesser
deprivation, or there may be an exact coincidence. In either case it
is arguable, though perhaps improbable, that the state provisions
have been superseded by the blanket federal termination of "rights,
privileges, and immunities," at least in elections for federal offices.
It is also possible that loyalty programs not limited to public em-
ployees or other occupational groups of special state concern (such
as lawyers and teachers) have been superseded. Measures applying
to all state residents can be justified only as a sanction on subver-
sive conduct Since the states, in the absence of facts giving rise
to a local breach of the peace, may no longer impose criminal sanc-
tions on subversive conduct, it is arguable that civil sanctions have
also been precluded. Several state courts have rejected this argu-
ment, but the Supreme Court has not yet passed on it. 4
The Nelson case would also appear to have a restrictive effect
of indeterminate proportions on the power of state legislatures to
investigate subversive activities. Legislative inquiries which affect
individual liberties are permitted only when a public need to obtain
information on which to base legislation concerning a recognized
ground without reaching question of pre-emption, 857 U.S. 545 (1958) (denial of
tax exemption to organization declining to file a declaration that it does not advo-
cate forceful overthrow of government).
41. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 857 U.S. 513, 517 n.3 (1958); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 854 U.S. 234 (1957) (issue presented but not decided).
42. Cf. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Commn, 380 U.S. 127 (1947).
48. 68 Stat. 776 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 842 (Supp. IV 1957). Apparently the
only case to have arisen under these provisions is Salwen v. Rees, 16 N.J. 216,
108 A.2d 265 (1954), in which section 3 of the act was upheld as a basis for
denying a candidate the right to appear on the ballot under the Communist Party
label in a local election.
44. First Unitarian Church v. Los Angeles, 48 Cal. 2d 419, 441, 311 P. 2d 508,
522 (1957), rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 545 (1958); Wyman v. Uphaus, 100
N.H. 486, 440, 130 A.2d 278, 282 (1957) aff'd, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); Kahn v.
Wyman, 100 N.H. 245, 128 A.2d 166 (1956). Compare Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 527 (1958).
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public evil justifies the intrusion. If the states lack effective legisla-
tive power with respect to a particular matter, such as sedition, it
would seem that the power to conduct legislative inquiries leading
toward such legislation would be reduced in scope. Of course, so
long as states are free to impose a wide range of civil disqualifica-
tions on alleged subversives, a wide-ranging legislative inquiry into
subversive activities within the state could be based on the need
to ascertain the factual basis for such legislation.45
These predictions indicate that the effect of the Nelson case on
state power may not be very great. The decision, if taken in its
broadest sweep, had potentialities of curtailing all state activity
with respect to subversion and loyalty. Though state courts have
given the decision wider effect, the Supreme Court has been re-
luctant to treat it as restricting any state activity other than crimi-
nal prosecutions for sedition. Withdrawal of this limited area from
state action has little significance since the states had demonstrated
little desire to utilize the various criminal proscriptions of sedition
and related crimes. Conduct involving violence, destruction of prop-
erty or other breaches of the peace remains within the criminal
jurisdiction of the states. The probable displacement of state regis-
tration schemes is also of slight significance since these statutes
had proved unworkable and were completely inoperative prior to
the Nelson case. The major areas in which the states have active
interests -legislative investigations and loyalty programs for pub-
lic employees and other special groups- have not been affected.
If the practical significance of the Nelson case on state power is
slight, the furor it has aroused is explained by other factors: the
dissatisfaction of congressmen who felt that congressional intent
had been misread; the pique of states' rights advocates who be-
lieved that the decision had made huge inroads upon state power;
and the symbolic demonstration of how the Court's doctrine of fed-
eral "occupation of the field" could effect broad displacements of
state authority in the absence of any manifestation of congressional
intent or conflict of statutory provisions. The Court's assertion that
communist sedition is a matter of paramount interest to the federal
government is perfectly sound. While the states had a major inter-
est in sedition in the bygone days of its use in controlling the dis-
ruptive effects of street-corner anarchist speeches, the modem prob-
lem of subversion by a tightly organized conspiracy is a national
problem calling for a national solution. Consequently, whatever
45. State power to conduct legislative investigations of subversive activities has
been sustained against a pre-emption argument in Wyman v. Uphaus, 100 N.H.
436, 440, 130 A.2d 278, 282 (1957), and Kahn v. Wyman, 100 N.H. 245, 123 A.2d
166 (1956). The petitioner in the Sweezy case made a pre-emption argument In the
Supreme Court, but the Court disposed of the case without reaching the question.
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the merits of the decision may be, congressional reversal seems less
and less likely as time goes by.
In June, 1959, after this Article was written, the Supreme Court
decided Uphaus v. Wyman.451 a While the Uphaus case is primarily
significant as a retrenchment from the position taken in Sweezy v.
New Hampshire,45b with respect to state legislative investigations of
subversive activity, a five-man majority went out of its way to scotch
claims that the Nelson case had the effect of curtailing virtually all
state activity in the field of subversion and loyalty. The decision
therefore provides convincing support for my earlier conclusions,
which I have left unchanged, concerning the probable effect of the
Nelson case.
The Uphaus case, however, does necessitate some further discus-
sion since it appears to consign the Nelson case to the limbo re-
served for precedents confined to their narrow facts. I have argued
that the reasonable intendment of Nelson is to prohibit any state
sedition prosecution in which the evidence also establishes an at-
tempt to overthrow the federal government. In Uphaus the Court
states categorically that Nelson did not deprive the states of the
right to punish sedition directed against them. If this is to have any
meaning where communist activity is involved, Nelson is restricted
to the improbable situation in which the state prosecutor fails to
allege that the defendants' actions were directed against the state
as well as the federal government. This is so because of the nature
of the communist movement. Communist sedition almost inevitably
is directed against both the federal government and the state gov-
ernment On the other hand, if the Court means to foreclose the
states from prosecuting when the activity is directed against both
federal and state governments, then the Uphaus dictum has little
significance.
The Court in Uphaus states that "All the [Nelson] opinion pro-
scribed was the race between federal and state prosecutors to the
courthouse door. The opinion made clear that a State could proceed
with prosecution for sedition against the State itself. . . . "4 These
statements were unnecessary to the holding that Nelson did not
foreclose state legislative investigations of subversive activity since
many facets of subversive conduct were clearly unaffected by the
Nelson case and a legislative investigation could always be predi-
cated on this continuing state power. But dictum or not, the difficul-
ties created by this considered statement must be taken into ac-
count
The Court apparently overlooked the fact that the Smith Act
45a. 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
45b. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
45c. 360 U.S. at 76.
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proscribes overthrow of state governments as well as of the federal
government.6 d Thus a race of prosecutors to the courthouse door is
still possible even when the conduct theoretically is directed solely
against the state. And, as has already been mentioned, the Court
ignored the basic fact that communist sedition is almost inevitably
directed against both levels of government. Thus, it is still impossi-
ble to predict whether or not a state may prosecute a member of
the Communist Party under a state sedition statute.
The Uphaus dictum also appears to reject the test set forth in
Nelson-whether or not the conduct involved a local breach of the
peace. Instead, state jurisdiction appears to turn on nothing more
than the form of the indictment. The Nelson test was at least under-
standable and workable. The Uphaus test, if it has any significance
at all, is a retreat to strict formalism which has neither virtue. What-
ever the merits of the Nelson case, it seems unwise for the Court to
play so loosely with it. The Uphaus dictum will be considered as a
retraction from the position taken in Nelson, and the general public
will not fail to conclude that the Court has bowed to hostile com-
ment and congressional pressure.
II. LrmrrAnoNs ON STATE LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
The power of state legislatures to compel testimony during the
conduct of legislative investigations is unquestioned, but the con-
stitutional limitations on this power have been relatively unexplored.
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,48 the Supreme Court for the first
time considered the right of witnesses to remain silent before state
legislative committees. Although the decision suggests that the
interest in free expression of ideas will outweigh a state's need for
information, at least when subversive activities are involved, the
case provides little guidance as to the controlling factors in bal-
ancing the interest of the state against the constitutional rights
of the witness. Since the Sweezy case grows out of the more de-
veloped law dealing with limitations on congressional investigating
power and builds on the foundation laid in the companion case
of Watkins v. United States,47 a brief survey of the federal develop-
ment seems necessary before we turn to the special problems in the
state area. Finally, a quick survey of recent developments will at-
tempt to assess the probable effect of Sweezy and Watkins.
A. Limitations on congressional power
Various constitutional provisions have been relied upon as im-
45d. 18 U.S.C. § 2885 (1952).
46. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
47. 854 U.S. 178 (1957).
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posing constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to com-
pel testimony in congressional investigations." The fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination has proved to be the surest
means of frustrating congressional questioners, but at a cost which
the witness often finds too great. Initially there was some doubt
whether the privilege was applicable to legislative investigations as
distinguished from judicial proceedings. Lower federal courts took
the initiative in recognizing the applicability of the privilege to
legislative investigations,49 and this view is now firmly established. 0
The marked tendency in recent years to relax the showing which
must be made by a witness claiming the privilege 5 has made the
fifth amendment the most popular refuge of reluctant witnesses.
But the use of the privilege may be disadvantageous even though a
claim of privilege is almost certain to be upheld whenever the
questions relate to alleged communist activities. In the first place,
adverse publicity is almost inevitable. Secondly, if security tests
are prevalent in the field of public or private employment in which
the witness is engaged, the use of the privilege may result in dis-
charge and loss of employment opportunities. It is for this reason
that one of the crucial issues in recent years has been the extent
48. See Driver, Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress To Punish
Contempts of Its Investigating Committees, 38 VA. L. REv. 887, 1011 (1952); Note,
Constitutional Limitations on the Un-American Activities Committee, 47 CoLum. L.
REv. 416 (1947); Note, The Power of Congress To Investigate and To Compel
Testimony, 70 HARV. L. REv. 671 (1957).
49. See, e.g., Aiuppa v. United States, 201 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1952); United
States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 844 U.S. 874 (1952).
50. Bart v. United States, 849 U.S. 219 (1955); Emspak v. United States, 349
U.S. 190 (1955); Quinn v. United States, 49 U.S. 155 (1955).
51. A witness claiming the privilege was originally required to show that his
answers might disclose a material element of a crime. 8 WVXcmorw, EvmmcE §§
2260-61 (8d ed. 1940). This rule was ameliorated by Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547 (1892), which held that a witness is privileged not to answer even a
seemingly harmless question if the answer to that question would enable a prosecu-
tor to discover incriminating evidence or otherwise tend to prove the commission
of a crime. But until the last few years the witness was required to show that
the apprehended dan.er was "'real and appreciable . . in the ordinary course of
things"' and not so" improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence
his conduct." Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 862, 865-66 (1917). The Mason
case has been quietly laid to rest by Hoffman v. United States, 841 U.S. 479 (1951),
and a series of per curiam reversals of lower federal court decisions which had
followed the Mason test. Trock v. United States, 351 U.S. 976 (1956); Singleton v.
United States, 84 U.S. 944 (1952); Greenberg v. United States, 343 U.S. 918(1952). Present law upholds the claim of the privilege if the witness can show
any imaginable connection, not wholly incredible, between a possible answer to a
question and a crime. The limits of human imagination being what they are, the
result is that a witness willing to claim the privilege can rarely be compelled to
answer. Relaxation of the showing necessary for a claim of the privilege was made
necessary by the complexity of the rules relating to waiver of the privilege by an-
swering seemingly harmless questions. See Rogers v. United States, 840 U.S. 867(1951). See generally Note, The Privilege Against Self-IncrimInation in the Federal
Courts, 70 H~Av. L. REv. 1454, 1455-58 (1957).
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to which adverse inferences might be drawn from the use of the
privilege against self-incrimination.52
The disadvantages of relying on the privilege against self-incrim-
ination have led to an exploration of other constitutional provisions
as limitations on congressional investigations. The fourth amend-
ment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures has been
suggested as a limit on the breadth of legislative demands to pro-
duce documents, 53 but this seems doubtful since a physical inva-
sion of the witness's person or premises is not involved.14 The em-
phasis on political activity and beliefs in congressional investiga-
tions of the last few decades has led to numerous attempts to justify
refusals to testify under the first amendment guarantee of freedom
of speech.55 Although first amendment rights have been recognized
in several cases, in each case the legislative need for information
has been held to outweigh the individual's interest." ' Thus reliance
on the first amendment has proved unsuccessful when congressional
investigations have been involved. The impact of various inquiries
on first amendment rights, however, has been a significant factor
in the development of statutory, procedural and due process limi-
tations on congressional investigations.
Three principal limitations have been developed. First, the in-
vestigation must have a valid legislative purpose in seeking infor-
mation concerning a subject with which Congress may legislate. "
Second, the investigating committee must have been specifically
authorized by Congress to conduct the investigation in question. 8
52. See text accompanying notes 157-59, 169-71 infra.
53. See United States v. Groves, 18 F. Supp. 3, 4 (W.D. Pa. 1937); cf. FTC v.
American Tobacco Co. 264 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1924); Boyd v. United States, 110
U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886).
54. See Note, The Power of Congress To Investigate and To Compel Testimony,
70 HcAv. L. REv. 671, 673-74 (1957).
55. See, e.g., Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 254 (D.C. Cir.). cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948) (dissenting opinion). See Comment, Legislative Inquiry
Into Political Activity: First Amendment Immunity From Committee Interrogation,
65 YALE L.J. 1159 (1956).
56. See, e.g., Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950); Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.).
cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948); United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 899 (1948).
57. Kilbourn v. Thom pson, 103 U.S. 168, 194-95 (1880). But a proper legisla-
tive purpose is presumedif the matter under inquiry is one with respect to which
Congress might validly legislate. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177-78
(1927); United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Lamont, 236 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1956) (indict-
ment must allege authorization of legislative committee to conduct investigation in
question); United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953); Rumely v.
United States, 197 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1952), aff'd, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); United
States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791 (D. Mass. 1956) (narrow construction of con-
gressional authorization).
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And finally, the questions asked must be "pertinent to the question
under inquiry.""9 These limitations, applied rather strictly because
of the involvement of constitutional rights, have their source both
in the contempt of Congress statute 0 and in the Constitution.
In Watkins v. United States,6" the Supreme Court, fusing first
amendment arguments and existing procedural limitations, evolved
a new and somewhat confusing procedural limitation on congres-
sional investigative power. Watkins, a labor organizer, was sum-
moned to appear before a subcommittee of the House Committee
on Un-American Activities after two witnesses had testified that
he had been a member of the Communist Party in 1944. Watkins
denied that he had been a communist and answered freely all ques-
tions relating to his political activities and associations. He declined,
however, to answer questions relating to the political activities of
past associates whom he did not believe were presently members
of the Communist Party.62 He did not invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination, but contended that the committee had no power
to ask such questions and that they were not relevant to any
valid legislative purpose. For his refusal to answer, Watkins was in-
dicted and convicted for statutory contempt of Congress. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, sitting en banc, affirmed the
conviction.63
The Supreme Court reversed Watins' conviction.64 The majority
59. 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952). See United States v. Orman,
207 F. 2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953); Bowers v. United States, 202 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir.
1953); Marshall v. United States, 176 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 933 (1950).
60. The contempt of Congress statute makes it a misdemeanor for any person
"who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Con-
gress. . . refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry.
Rxv. STAT. § 102 (1875), as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952).
61. 354 U.S. 178 (1957). The Watkins case is discussed in the following articles
and notes, among others: Fleischmann, Watkins v. United States and Congressional
Power of Investigation, 9 HAsrwcs L.J. 145 (1958); Nathanson, The Supreme
Court as a Unit of the National Government: Herein of Separation of Powers and
Political Questions, 6 J. PuB. L. 331 (1957); Nutting, The Watkins Case-A
Critique, 43 A.B.A.J. 1029 (1957); Note, The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 HAnv.
L. REv. 141-46 (1957); Comment, 56 Micn. L. REv. 272 (1957); Comment,
Congress v. The Courts: Limitations on Congressional Investigation, 24 U. Cm.
L. REv. 740 (1957).
62. Watkins said:
I am not going to plead the fifth amendment, but I refuse to answer certain
questions that I believe are outside the proper scope of your committee's activ-
ities. I will answer any questions which this committee puts to me about myself.
I will also answer questions about those persons whom I knew to be members
of the Communist Party and whom I believe still are. I will not, however,
answer any questions with respect to others with whom I associated in the past.
354 U.S. 178, 185 (1957).
63. Watkins v. United States, 233 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
64. 354 U.S. 178 (1957). The Chief Justice wrote for the majority of six. Mr.
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opinion by the Chief Justice, a long and discursive essay on legis-
lative investigations and constitutional rights, is lacking in clarity.
But as Mr. Justice Frankfurter emphasized in his concurring opin-
ion, the narrow holding of the case is only that the vagueness of the
authorizing resolution and the undefined scope of the subcommit-
tee inquiry failed to satisfy the due process requirements of definite-
ness.
65
The House of Representatives had authorized the Un-American
Activities Committee and its subcommittees to investigate all as-
pects "of un-American propaganda . . . [which] attacks the prin-
ciple of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution.
".. -I This resolution was thought to be so vague and broad that
it did not inform Watkins what questions it authorized the subcom-
mittee to ask. Nor did the subcommittee chairman, at the opening
of the hearing, explain the scope and nature of the inquiry with
sufficient particularity to enable Watkins to determine what ques-
tions would be relevant to the matter under inquiry.17 The statute
under which Watkins was convicted condemns only a refusal to
answer questions which are "pertinent" to the inquiry, thus making
pertinency an element of the offense."" Since Watkins was put in
the position of being unable to ascertain the conduct required of
him by law, due process standards of definiteness in criminal prose-
cutions were violated by his conviction. 0
This holding marks some advance over prior doctrine, but it is
Justice Frankfurter joined the opinion of the Court, but also filed a supplemental
concurring opinion stressing the narrow grounds of decision. Mr. Justice Clark
was the lone dissenter, and Justices Burton and Whittaker did not participate.
65. 354 U.S. at 216--17 (concurring opinion). The vagueness argument accepted
in Watkins bad been rejected by the Second Circuit in United States v. Josephson,
165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), and the Supreme Court had denied certiorari. 335
U.S. 899 (1948).
66. H.R. Res. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CoNe. REc. 15, 18 (1953).
67. I am satisfied from a reading of the record that Watkins was not laboring
under any misapprehension concerning the nature of the inquiry- it was part
of a continuing investigation of communist infiltration of important labor unions.
See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clark, 354 U.S. at 225-27.
68. The Court's emphasis on the use of the statutory contempt procedure raises
the question whether Congress could circumvent the holding by returning to the
older practice of direct contempt of Congress. A person committed by action of
Congress itself can test the legality of his detention in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). And pertinency of the questions
to a valid legislative inquiry would appear to be a constitutional issue open on
habeas corpus. Thus any attempt by Congress to override the Watkins case is likely
to raise serious constitutional questions. Of course, the practical inconvenience of a
trial by the House would tend to deter Congress from reverting to this practice.
69. See United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); United States v. Cardiff,
344 U. S. 174 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Musser v. Utah,
333 U.S. 95 (1948); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
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not a startling or unexpected development. The surprising features
of the Watkins case are the suggestions in the opinion of the Chief
Justice that congressional investigations will be subjected in the
future to delegation of power and first amendment limitations.
The emphasis on delegation of power comes in a portion of the
opinion which stresses the separation of responsibility for exercise
of investigative power from the actual exercise of that power.0
The concern is with the relationship between the legislative body
and the investigative body, and the requirement is that the legisla-
ture set forth with some clarity the authority of the investigatory
body to conduct an investigation serving a valid legislative purpose.
The vice of unconfined discretion in investigation is twofold: it is
impossible for the witness to know whether or not the questions
are pertinent to a valid inquiry, and, in addition, it is impossible
for a court to know whether the parent body really wants the in-
formation being gathered by its investigators. The former is merely
a restatement of the due process vagueness objection; the latter is
apparently based on a concern that judicial review will be frus-
trated if the legislature does not circumscribe the authority of its
investigators in terms which a court can assess.
One emphatic statement in the Chief Justice's opinion deserves
repeating: "... . there is no congressional power to expose for the
sake of exposure." 71 the basis for this asserted limitation on the
scope of legislative power presumably is that exposure is a form of
punishment for past acts which is an exclusive judicial function.
The legislature has no power to conduct proceedings which are
essentially trials of guilt without the procedural safeguards of a
judicial proceeding controlled by an independent judiciary. This
is a common-sense formulation of the objections many persons have
felt to the more flamboyant congressional investigations. The
Court's vigorous statement of this view, premised on the concept
of separation of powers, exemplifies the way in which an unfashion-
able constitutional doctrine may re-emerge in a different era with
renewed vitality.72
70. 854 U.S. at 200-06.
71. Id. at 200.
72. In Kent v. Dulles, 857 U.S. 116, 129 (1958), the Court said:
If that 'liberty' [right of exit from the United States] is to be regulated, it
must be pursuant to the law-making functions of the Congress.... And if that
power is delegated, the standards must be adequate to pass scrutiny by the
accepted tests.... Where activities of enjoyment, natural and often necessary
to the well-being of an American citizen, such as travel, are involved, we will
construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them.
In United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958), Mr. Justice Douglas, in a
dissenting opinion, relied on an illegal delegation of power argument in attacking the
constitutionality of the Assimilative Crimes Act of 1948. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
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The doctrine of separation of powers figured prominently in the
Court's first contact-in 1881-with the use of the subpoena
power to compel testimony by private citizens before a congres-
sional investigating committee. In Kilbourn v. Thompson78 this
doctrine was utilized to supply a holding that Congress, in con-
ducting an investigation into the operation of a real estate pool in
which the United States had a creditor's interest, usurped the
judicial function and thus exceeded its own power. Subsequent
cases cast doubt on the separation of powers rationale,74 but Watkins
appears to have given it a rebirth. If so, the validity of the so-called
"ventilating" investigation, in which Congress seeks to educate
and inform the public in order to arouse popular support for par-
ticular legislation, is questionable. The Court, however, is careful
to say: "The public is, of course, entitled to be informed concern-
ing the workings of its government."75 This and other statements
leave the impression that "exposure" may have a wider scope when
it is government officials, rather than private citizens, who are being
grilled.76
The impact of legislative investigations on first amendment rights
is sketched in equally broad fashion in Watkins. The first amend-
ment is applicable to legislative investigations because they are
"part of lawmaking." 77 The interest protected is the individual's
right to participate fully in the political process without answering
to the state for that activity, as well as the indirect inhibition of
political discussion which may result from a fear that expression of
unorthodox views may lead to public obloquy. To compel a witness
to testify "against his will, about his beliefs, expressions or associa-
tions is a measure of government interference" 78 with first amend-
ment freedom which is not to be allowed in the absence of a clear
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), is premised on the doctrine of separation of
powers.
73. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
74. In United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953), the Court spoke of
"the loose language of Kilbourn v. Thompson" and "the inroads that have been
made upon that case by later cases." See also, McCrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135,
177-80 (1927); United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953).
75. 354 U.S. at 200.
76. The most central of congressional investigating powers is that of dotormin-
ing whether various branches of the federal government are executing the laws
in an efficient, honest manner. The Court's opinion in Watkins recognized this: "We
are not concerned with the power of the Congress to inquire into and publicize cor-
ruption, maladministration or inefficiency in agencies of the Government." 354 U.S.
at 200 n.33 (1957). See also id. at 187.
77. Id. at 197. Under this view the 'law" abridging speech is the prospective
legislation which the investigation may precede. It would seem more plausible to
regard the congressional resolution as a 'law" for the purposes of the first amend-
ment.
78. 354 U.S. at 197.
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showing that the public necessity for the information outweighs
the inevitable impact on individual freedom. And it is not only the
effect on the witness which is relevant, but the indirect effect on
the climate of opinion and general freedom of expression. The
Court, in the last analysis, must strike this balance; but in order to
do so it must be able to measure the legislative need for the infor-
mation. In order to weigh this need against the competing demands
of individual expression, a "clear determination by the House or
the Senate that a particular inquiry is justified by a specific legisla-
tive need" must be provided.7 The devitalization of judicial review
once again appears to be the vice which leads the Court to demand
clarity of legislative authorizations.
This jumble of constitutional and procedural limitations -the
pertinency of the questions to the inquiry, the validity of the delega-
tion to the committee, the constitutional validity of the legislative
purpose, and the impact of the investigation on first amendment
guarantees -necessarily entails considerable confusion. But it is
doubtful that the confusion is entirely unintentional. In Watkins
a substantial majority of the Court has joined in an opinion which
combines exhortation with warning. Without deciding any ques-
tions of power, it has cautioned Congress that the unrestricted in-
trusion of legislative investigations into private affairs will not, if
continued, go unchecked. Meanwhile, new procedural limitations
will operate to protect witnesses and enhance judicial review.
B. Limitations on state legislative investigations
Many of these principles are also relevant to the power of state
legislatures to compel testimony in the course of legislative investi-
gations. The scope of state investigatory power is a question of
state law and varies from state to state depending upon the re-
spective constitutional provisions and their judicial interpretation.
In general, the investigatory power of the state legislatures, like
that of Congress, may be employed whenever appropriate to an
exercise of recognized legislative powers." Similarly, the four-
79. Id. at 205.
80. The following state cases deal with legislative power to compel testimony:
Ex parte Coon, 44 Cal. App. 2d 581, 112 P.2d 767 (1941); State ex rel. Benemov-
sky v. Sullivan, 37 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1948); Opinion of the Justices, 331 Mass. 764,
119 N.E.2d 385 (1954); Wyman v. Uphaus, 100 N.H. 436, 130 A.2d 278, aff'd per
curiam after reargument, 101 N.H. 139, 136 A.2d 221 (1957); Kahn v. Wyman,
100 N.H. 245, 123 A.2d 166 (1956); Daniman v. Board of Educ., 806 N.Y. 532,
119 N.E.2d 373 (1954); Smith v. Kern, 285 N.Y. 632. 33 N.E.2d 556 (1941); In re
Joint Legislative Comm., 285 N.Y. 1, 32 N.E.2d 769 (1941); In re Martens, 109
Misc. 492, 180 N.Y. Supp. 171 (Sup. Ct. 1919); State v. Morgan, 167 Ohio St. 295,
147 N.E.2d 847 (1958); Fawick Airflex Co. v. Electrical Workers, 56 Ohio L. Abs.
419, 92 N.E.2d 431 (Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 154 Ohio St. 206, 93 N.E.2d
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teenth amendment to the federal constitution imposes significant
limitations on the exercise of investigative powers by state legisla-
tures. Freedom of speech and related freedoms are fundamental
rights protected against state abridgment through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 ' The fourth and fifth amend-
ments, however, are not fully incorporated in the fourteen th
amendment -8 2 and state action involving unreasonable searches or
self-incrimination falls within the ban of the due process clause
only if the challenged action is thought to violate those minimal
standards which are "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty."8 3 Thus the fourth and fifth amendments may not be re-
lied on directly, but only as the due process clause itself secures
the minimal decencies of civilized society. 4
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,"5 the Court's dicta in Watkins are
the foundation for a holding which merges first amendment and
due process notions. In 1951 New Hampshire enacted a Subversive
Activities Act 6 which imposed various disabilities on "subversive
persons" and "subversive organizations." In 1953 a resolution of the
legislatureI constituted the attorney general a one-man legislative
committee to investigate violations of the 1951 act and to recom-
mend additional legislation. Sweezy, a noncommunist Marxist, was
summoned to testify at the investigation conducted by the attorney
general pursuant to this authorization. Sweezy testified freely about
many matters but refused to answer two types of questions: (1) in-
480 (1950); Matson v. Jackson, 368 Pa. 283, 83 A.2d 134 (1951); State v. James,
36 Wash. 2d 882, 221 P.2d 482 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 911 (1951); State
ex rel. Robinson v. Fluent, 30 Wash. 2d 194, 191 P.2d 241 (1948), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 844 (1948).
81. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Gitlow v. New York, 208
U.S. 652 (1925).
82. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947).
83. The phrase is that of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937). See also Adamson v. California, 832 U.S. 46 (1947).
84. Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958), is a dramatic illustration of the
limited protection the federal constitution provides against self-incrimination in a
state proceeding. The Court held that it was not a denial of due process for the state
to compel Knapp, over his objection, to testify as to matters which might incrini-
nate him under federal law, at least where there was no showing that federal of-
ficers had induced or participated in the testimonial compusion. This is so ever
though the compelled testimony may be the basis of a federal prosecution. Feld-
man v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); cf. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959) (state conviction for bank robbery may follow federal acquittal for same
acts). And the Court has recently held that the fact that federal officers have co-
operated with state officials does not make the fifth amendment available. Mills v.
Louisiana, 360 U.S. 230 (1959).
85. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
86. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 588:1-16 (1955).
87. N.H. Laws 1953, ch. 307. See Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 105 A.2d 756
(1954).
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quiries concerning the activities of the Progressive Party in New
Hampshire during the 1948 election campaign; and (2) inquiries
concerning a lecture Sweezy had delivered during 1954 to a class
at the University of New Hampshire.ss For these failures to answer,
Sweezy was adjudged in contempt by a state court. The New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court, while recognizing that the legislative investi-
gation impaired Sweezy's first amendment rights, affirmed the con-
tempt commitment on the ground that the state's interest in uncov-
ering subversive activities within the state justified the impairment. 9
The Supreme Court reversed, but no opinion was able to obtain
a clear majority of the Court.90 The Chief Justice, joined by Justices
Black, Douglas, and Brennan, began by reaffirming the position
taken in the Watkins case that legislative investigations may easily
encroach on first amendment rights. He then turned his fire on the
New Hampshire Subversive Activities Act of 1951, to which the
scope of the attorney general's authority had been tied by the au-
thorizing resolution. The definition of "subversive persons" and
"subversive organizations" in this act were said to be so vague and
limitless that they extended to "conduct which is only remotely
related to actual subversion and which is done completely free of
any conscious intent to be a part of such activity.""' The opinion
then went on to discuss gratuitously and at some length the impor-
tance of academic freedom and political expression, emphasizing
that a strong showing of justification would be necessary to permit
any infringement in these areas. 2 Finally, the Chief Justice con-
cluded, it was unnecessary in this case to balance the interest of the
state against the rights of the individual -the resolution authoriz-
ing the investigation was so broad and unlimited that a valid state
interest had not been expressed.
The respective roles of the legislature and the investigator thus revealed
are of considerable significance to the issue before us. It is eminently
clear that the basic discretion of determining the direction of the legisla-
tive inquiry has been turned over to the investigative agency. The Attorney
General has been given such a sweeping and uncertain mandate that it
is his decision which picks out the subjects that will be pursued, what
88. No question with respect to a state's power to investigate activities at a
state-supported university was presented, since the New Hampshire Supreme Court
had held that this purpose was not within the authority conferred on the attorney
general. Hence the questions relating to the lecture could only be upheld as they
related to Sweezy as a possible "subversive person."
89. Wyman v .Sweezy, 100 N.H. 103, 121 A.2d 783 (1956).
90. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
with whom Mr. Justice Harlan joined, concurred in the result, but on another ground.
Mr. Justice Clark dissented in an opinion which Mr. Justice Burton joined. Mr.
Justice Whittaker did not participate.
91. Id. at 247.
92. Id. at 249-52.
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witness will be summoned and what questions will be asked. In this cir-
cumstance, it cannot be stated authoritatively that the legislature asked
the Attorney General to gather the kind of facts comprised in the sub/ects
upon which petitioner was interrogated.93
Four members of the Court, in concurring and dissenting opin-
ions, took vigorous issue with the Chief Justice for suggesting that
the conviction was invalid because of the legislature's failure to
provide adequate standards for the attorney general. They argued
that the apportionment and delegation of powers within a state
government are matters of state law beyond the reach of the four-
teenth amendment. 4 Since the New Hampshire court had deter-
mined that the attorney general had acted within the scope of the
authority granted him by the legislature, the Court was required
to balance the legislative need for the information against the im-
pairment of first amendment rights which the investigation entailed.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, concluded
that the individual must prevail in this case because there was no
basis for a belief that Sweezy or the Progressive Party threatened
the safety of the state;9" whereas Mr. Justice Clark, joined by Mr.
Justice Burton, arrived at the opposite conclusion that New Hamp-
shire's interest in self-preservation justified the intrusion into
Sweezy's personal affairs.96
The most puzzling aspect of the Sweezy case is the reliance by
the Chief Justice on delegation of power conceptions. New Hamp-
shire had determined that it wanted the information which Sweezy
refused to give; to say that the state had not demonstrated that it
wanted the information seems so unreal as to be incredible. The
state had delegated power to the attorney general to determine
the scope of inquiry within the general subject of subversive activi-
ties; the attorney general had exercised this power in questioning
Sweezy; and the New Hampshire courts had determined that the
attorney general was acting within his delegated authority. Under
these circumstancs the conclusion of the Chief Justice that the
vagueness of the resolution violates the due process clause must be,
despite his protestations,9 7 a holding that a state legislature cannot
delegate such a power. It seems unlikely that the view of the
Chief Justice, which has yet to commend itself to a majority of the
Court, will be accepted in the long-run.
The narrower due process holding of Watkins, however, is likely
93. Id. at 253. (Emphasis added.)
94. See, e.g., Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902). But cf. Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) (dictum).
95. 354 U.S. at 260-67 (concurring opinion).
96. Id. at 270 (dissenting opinion).
97. Id. at 255.
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to be more durable. In Scull v. Virginia98 a contempt conviction for
refusal to answer questions put by a Virginia legislative committee
was reversed by a unanimous Court on the ground that the com-
mittee had failed to inform the witness in what respect the ques-
tions were pertinent to the inquiry. Witnesses in state investiga-
tions, as well as federal, must be clearly apprised of the basis of
the questions in order that they may have a fair opportunity to de-
termine whether or not they are required to answer the particular
questions.
C. The Barenblatt and Uphaus cases
The brave, if confusing, language of Watkins and Sweezy repre-
sented a substantial shift of mood on the part of the Court. Legis-
lative investigations were no longer to be immune from judicial
scrutiny. Yet the generative power of the two cases remained very
problematical.
The Watkins case was the more conventional holding. Its initial
effect was to encourage lower federal courts to interpret strictly
congressional authorizing resolutions"9 and to require congressional
committee chairmen to clarify the pertinence of particular questions
to the matter under inquiry.100 But any prediction that the Court
would impose severe restrictions on the power of congressional in-
vestigation itself was destroyed by Barenblatt v. United States01
which reflected a partial retreat from the position taken in Watkins
as well as a clarification of questions it had left open.
A crucial question left unsettled by Watkins was whether vague-
nes and breadth of an authorizing resolution is itself bad. If so, the
organization of congressional investigating committees would be
substantially affected. Standing committees with broad authoriza-
tions and settled jurisdiction would be precluded from conducting
investigations requiring use of the subpoena power. This would
force Congress to create ad hoc committees for the purpose of con-
ducting particular investigations. This issue appears to have been
settled by the 5-4 decision in Barenblatt, where the majority took
the position that a clarification at the hearing by the committee
chairman of the nature and scope of the inquiry satisfies the due
process requirements laid down in Watkins. Since the opinion in
Watkins appeared to view a precise authorizing resolution and an
98. 859 U.S. 844 (1959).
99. E.g., Brewster v. United States, 255 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (authoriza-
tion of Senate Committee on Government Operations not sufficiently clear to compel
labor union official to testify concerning misuse of union funds).
100.. See Flaxer v. United States, 858 U.S. 147 (1958); Sacher v. United States,
856 U.S. 576 (1958) (per curiam).
101. 860 U.S. 109 (1959).
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on-the-spot clarification by the committee chairman as alternative
methods of demonstrating the pertinency of particular questions,
the Barenblatt interpretation seems correct.
On the issues of the pertinency of the questions and the constitu-
tional rights of the individual, the Barenblatt majority adheres to
the doctrine stated in Watkins, but its application of that doctrine
reflects a more hospitable approach to congressional investigation.
Barenblatt was a graduate student and teaching fellow at the Uni-
versity of Michigan from 1947 to 1950 and an instructor in psychol-
ogy at Vassar Colege from 1950 to shortly before he was sub-
poenaed by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-Ameri-
can Activities. The subcommittee was conducting an inquiry con-
cerning alleged communist infiltration into the field of education.
Barenblatt refused on first amendment grounds to answer five ques-
tions pertaining to Communist Party membership and alleged
communist activities of himself and another person while at the
University of Michigan. On appeal from his conviction for these
refusals to answer, Barenblatt contended that he was not ade-
quately apprised of the pertinency of the subcommittee's questions
to the subject matter of the inquiry and that he was privileged to
refuse to answer because the questions infringed rights protected
by the first amendment.
The Court, after indicating that Barenblatt had not properly
raised the issue of pertinency by making a specific objection on this
ground to the subcommittee, went on to conclude that the perti-
nency of the questions was clear from the record. It relied on many
of the same features which had been present in Watkins, such as a
general announcement of the subcommittee's purposes, but also
on the additional features that Barenblatt, unlike Watkins, had re-
fused to answer questions about his activities; that Barenblatt had
heard other witnesses being interrogated concerning the announced
subject matter; and that all the questions related to education
whereas in Watkins a small number fell outside the announced sub-
ject matter.
On the central issue of first amendment rights, the opinion of Mr.
Justice Harlan for five members of the Court adopts the relativistic
position represented by such decisions as Dennis v. United States0"'
and long championed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter: the Court must
balance the rights of the competing private and public interests.
The Court in performing this difficult task concluded that the field
of education was not immune from all inquiry merely because of its
importance to the free flow of ideas, and that investigation of com-
munist infiltration into the field of education related to a valid legis-
102. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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lative purpose. The dominant aim of the inquiry was said not to be
with abstract ideas but with the unlawful advocacy of overthrow
of government. Under the circumstances of the case, the Court
concluded, the governmental interest in disclosure outweighed the
individual's interest in standing mute.
The significance of Barenblatt lies in the premises which the ma-
jority of the Court will utilize when weighing the private and public
interests involved in each case. Most important, the motives of the
investigators will not be scruitinized but legitimacy will be assumed
if a valid legislative purpose is at hand. The governmental interest,
particularly of Congress, in informing itself about the threat of
communism to free institutions will be given considerable weight.
Under this approach, if a congressional committee prudently in-
forms the witness of the subject matter under inquiry and does not
engage in wide-ranging inquiries concerning ideas, politics, religion,
and so on, any investigation of communist subversion will probably
be sustained. The overall effect of the Watkins and Barenblatt cases
appears to be that Congress will be required to delegate investiga-
tive power with somewhat greater care; that commitee chairmen
will be required to clarify the pertinency of particular questions to
the matter under inquiry; and that the free-wheeling character of
many congressional investigations will be reduced but not elimi-
nated. Severe restrictions will not be imposed on the power of con-
gressional investigation itself. Any attempt to do so would risk a
pitched battle with the Congress -a contest in which the Congress
has the superior weapons.
In the area of state legislative investigations, the 1958 Term of
the Supreme Court resulted in both a consolidation of earlier posi-
tions and a partial retreat from the advanced ground of the Sweezy
case. Scull v. Virginia 0 3 extended the due process vagueness point
of Watkins to state legislative investigations. Ralmj v. Ohio,04 pre-
senting a novel issue of entrapment, reinforced previous intimations
that fairness to witnesses would be required. On the other hand,
Uphaus v. Wyman0 5 had the effect of placing the decision in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire under a cloud.
Immediately after the Sweezy case, it appeared that any role of
103. 359 U.S. 344 (1959). The Ohio Un-American Activities Commission, while
questioning witnesses about alleged subversive conduct, led them to believe that
they had a right to rely on the state privilege against self-incrimination. Their sub-
sequent contempt convictions for refusals to answer were atlrmed by the Ohio
Supreme Court on the ground that, under state law, the privilege was unavailable
because of a state immunity statute. The Court was unanimous in holding that
due process was violated when persons were convicted, after being told that they
might properly refuse to answer incriminating questions, for these refusals.
104. 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
105. 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
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the states in dealing with subversion would not be looked upon
favorably by the Court. It seemed likely that the reduced operation
of state law in this field would make it difficult for a state to justify
an investigation which substantially affected first amendment rights.
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan had indicated in their concurring
opinion in Sweezy that a heavy burden rested on the states: they
must demonstrate an existing threat to the safety of the state. Since
the Chief Justice and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan appeared
to require an even greater justification, if any showing at all would
justify an infringement of first amendment rights, state investiga-
tions of subversive activity seemed to be substantially limited.
The Uphaus case is a startling reversal of form. Uphaus ran a
summer camp in New Hampshire at which speakers and guests car-
ried on discussions of political and economic matters. The New
Hampshire attorney general, operating under authority of the same
statutes involved in the Sweezy case, asked Uphaus to produce the
names of all persons who attended the camp during two summer
seasons and the correspondence which he had carried on with those
persons. He based his demand on information that Uphaus, along
with some of the speakers, were members of the Communist Party
or of organizations cited as subversive or communist controlled on
the list of the United States attorney general. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court had reaffirmed Uphaus' conviction after the case
had been remanded to it for consideration in light of the Sweezy
case. When the case reached the Supreme Court for the second
time, the conviction was affirmed on the ground that New Hamp-
shire's interest in determining the presence of "subversive persons"
within the state outweighed Uphaus' interest in associational pri-
vacy.The justification for the inquiry was found in the fact that a
number of the speakers had either been members of the Communist
Party or had connections with organizations listed as subversive,
and that the camp, which was operated as a public lodging place,
was required by state law to maintain a register of guests. The mo-
tives of the attorney general in conducting the investigation were
not scrutinized, although the dissenting opinion contained a per-
suasive argument that exposure was the primary purpose.
In the aftermath of Uphaus, the lengthy opinion of Chief Justice
Warren in the Sweezy case continues to be supported by only four
members of the Court. On the other hand, the approach of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, expressed in his concurring opinion in the
Sweezy case, appears to command a bare majority of the present
personnel of the Court. While the balance of the Court is so pre-
carious that prediction is difficult, it would seem that greater re-
spect will be given to state investigations than had seemed probable
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after the Sweezy case; that judicial self-restraint in determining
constitutional questions is on the increase; that the motives of state
or federal legislators in conducting investigations will not be ex-
amined by the Court; but that, nevertheless, the Court is extremely
sensitive to first amendment rights and will attempt to vindicate
them when it feels that legislative inquiries are colored by unfair-
ness or have gone too far. How far is too far remains indeterminable.
III. LJmrATIONS ON STATE Pow.a To I0os5E
CIVIL DISQUALTFICATIONS
The most significant state activity with respect to subversion and
loyalty has been the imposition of civil disqualifications on persons
and organizations considered subversive. Individuals unable or un-
willing to comply with state law requiring the taking of a loyalty
oath or the revelation of information deemed relevant to loyalty
have been deprived of voting rights, occupational opportunities
with both public and private employers, and various other benefits
and privileges. The imposition of these civil disqualifications has
raised fundamental constitutional issues which increasingly have
found their way to the Supreme Court.
It would be idle to pretend that the Courts resolution of these
issues has followed a consistent pattern or resulted in a precise
package of predictable rules. For the Court, like society at large,
has been unguided by prior experience, confused by the complexity
of the problems, and influenced by divergent views concerning, on
the one hand, the magnitude of the threat posed by communist
tactics and, on the other, the effect of the various legislative meas-
ures on the climate of freedom which is so vital to a vigorous de-
mocracy.
Wbile those who seek certainty should turn their attention to
less volatile fields of constitutional law, an increasing degree of
clarity can now be provided. More than a decade of experience with
the constitutional problems of state loyalty programs has begun
to produce a viable body of principle. It is impossible in brief com-
pass to canvass the entire subject,00 but the doctrinal development
in the two major areas of disqualification for public employment
and for private employment will be surveyed. In addition, the exist-
ence and implications of the claim that the first amendment confers
a right to silence will be discussed.
A. Di qualifcation for public employment
It is unnecessary to pause over the semantic battle as to whether
106. For comprehensive treatment see BRoWN, LOYALTY AN SEcunrrY (1958).
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public employment is a "privilege" or a "right," for nothing should
turn on such a barren classification. More intricate distinctions de-
termine constitutional rights. It is clear, on the one hand, that the
Constitution does not guarantee public office to anyone. Any gov-
ernmental body can impose appropriate requirements to secure pub-
lic employees who are qualified to discharge the manifold tasks of
government. 10 7 On the other hand, the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment prohibits state and local governments from
arbitrarily excluding persons from public employment on grounds
which have no rational relation to suitability for such employ-
ment.18 Similarly, the equal protection clause forbids a discrimina-
tory classification, unrelated to fitness, which excludes a group of
persons from public employment. 10 These principles serve as a
foundation for dealing with the issues raised by statutes requiring a
noncommunist oath of public employees.
Garner v. Board of Pub. Works,"t0 the first of the major decisions,
provides a convenient starting point. A 1941 amendment to the Los
Angeles charter disqualified for municipal employment all persons
declining to take an oath that they did not advocate the overthrow
of the government by unlawful means or belong to organizations
with such objectives. This charter amendment was implemented in
1948 by an ordinance requiring all city employees (1) to execute an
affidavit "'stating whether or not he is or ever was a member of
the Commumist Party,""" and (2) to take an oath that at present
or within the five preceding years they had not advocated the over-
throw of the government by unlawful means or belonged to organ-
izations with such objectives. Two municipal employees took the
oath but refused to execute the affidavit; thirteen others refused
to do either. After being discharged for these refusals, they brought
an action in a state court for reinstatement and unpaid salaries.
The state court denied relief, 1 2 and the Supreme Court affirmed."'
The Court treated the affidavit and the oath as raising distinct
issues. The issue raised by the affidavit was simply whether a city
might require its employees to disclose membership in the Commu-
nist Party. Seven members of the Court thought the answer clear."'
107. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Hawker v. New
York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
108. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 168 (1923); Dent v. West Virginia, 129
U.S. 114, 123-28 (1889); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 319-20
(1867).
109. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
110. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
111. Id. at 719.
112. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 98 Cal. App. 2d 493, 220 P.2d 958 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1950).
113. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
114. Only Justices Black and Douglas dissented with respect to the affidavit.
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Public employees could be required to disclose any matter relevant
to a determination of present fitness and suitability for public serv-
ice. In the context of the 1950's, membership in the Communist
Party was relevant "to effective and dependable government, and
to the confidence of the electorate in its government" n' Govern-
ment need not place its trust in persons dedicated to overthrow the
government by force and violence. The Court emphasized, how-
ever, that since the dismissals of the two employees who refused
to execute the affidavit rested on their refusals to supply relevant in-
formation, no question was presented as to whether a discharge
might be based on information in an affidavit, such as an admission
of past membership in the Communist Party.' 16
A bare majority of the Court justified the oath on somewhat dif-
ferent grounds.' The 1941 charter amendment was said to deny
city employment to any persons who thereafter should fail to com-
ply with its requirements of loyalty. The oath did not have a retro-
spective operation because it implemented the charter amendment,
imposing the identical standard in the form of an oath covering the
period 1945-1948. Nor was it invalid as a bill of attainder since it
did not inflict punishment, but "merely provide[d] standards of
qualification and eligibility for employment." " 8 A contention that
the oath violated the due process clause because it was not limited
to knowing membership in the proscribed organizations was
avoided by an adroit rewriting of the municipal ordinance. The
ordinance did not in terms require scienter; nevertheless the Court
assumed that scienter was implicit in each clause of the oath. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, believing that it was improper for the Court
to imply such a requirement in the absence of a state court inter-
pretation, dissented from this portion of the Garner case. Justices
Black, Douglas and Burton also dissented from the Court's valida-
tion of the oath, arguing that it was invalid as a bill of attainder
since it operated retrospectively as a perpetual bar to employees
who had held certain views at any time since a date five years pre-
ceding the effective date of the ordinance.
The Garner case, therefore, is a square holding that present or
recent membership in the Communist Party or any other organiza-
tion with illegal objectives is relevant to the fitness of persons for
They thought the case in all its aspects was controlled by Cummings v. Missouri,
71 U.S. (4 WaIl) 277 (1867), and Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 WalL) 3 (1867),
in which test oaths directed against adherents of the confederate cause were struck
down as bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.
115. 341 U.S. at 725 (separate opinion).
116. Id. at 720, 730.
117. Justices Frankfurter and Burton, in addition to Justices Black and Douglas,
dissented from this portion of the case.
118. 341 U.S. at 722.
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public employment, and that a refusal to supply information relat-
ing to such membership or to take an oath of nonmembership is
ground for discharge from public employment. A necessary presup-
position of this holding is that "no unit of government can be denied
the right to keep out of its employ those who seek to overthrow
the government by force or violence, or are knowingly members of
an organization engaged in such endeavor." 119
Gerende v. Board of Supervisors"I and Adler v. Board of Edu-
cation121 applied similar principles to related situations. The Ger-
ende case indicated that eligibility for elective office could be con-
ditioned on the execution of a loyalty oath negating knowing mem-
bership in organizations engaged in an attempt to overthrow the
government by force and violence. The Adler case, validating an in-
volved statutory scheme which sought to bar from employment in
the public schools persons who advocate, or belong to organizations
which advocate, the overthrow of the government by unlawful
means, is a less satisfactory precedent. The Court's opinion appears
to rely heavily on the "privilege" concept and contains broad
language which the Court certainly no longer accepts. 22 Secondly,
as Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out in his dissenting opinion,
the Court upheld the statutory scheme before it had been applied
against any individuals or interpreted by the state courts, thus vio-
lating the Court's self-imposed jurisdictional limitations of standing
and ripeness.
Each of these cases contained strong intimations that a loyalty
oath or other procedure which disqualified individuals on the basis
of innocent membership in the Communist Party would be in-
valid. 2 3 Wieman v. Updegraff114 fulfilled these intimations by hold-
ing that "indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing
activity" is an "assertion of arbitrary power" which violates the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 25 An Oklahoma stat-
119. Id. at 725 (concurring opinion).
120. 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
121. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
122. [Persons employed or seeking employment in the public schools] havo
no right to work for the State in the school system on their own terms....
They may work for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid down by
the proper authorities of New York. If they do not choose to work on such
terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go else-
where.
Id. at 492. Cf. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952).
123. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 494 (1952); Garrer v. Board of
Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 723-24 (1951); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341
U.S. 56-57 (1951).
124. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
125. Id. at 191.
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ute required state officers and employees to take a loyalty oath that
they were not and for five years immediately preceding the taking
of the oath had not been affiliated with or members of organiza-
tions on the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations. The
Court interpreted state court decisions involving the oath as con-
struing it so as to exclude persons solely on the basis of organiza-
tional membership, regardless of their knowledge concerning the
organization. The innocent member thus received the same treat-
ment as the member aware of illegal purposes. The Court was unan-
imous in holding that membership in organizations advocating over-
throw of government, if it is to be the ground for disqualification
from public employment, must be a knowing membership.
The Wieman case was a harbinger of the future in several re-
spects. Concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, emphasized that the
loyalty oath was being applied to teachers and expressed their
views that freedom of expression was imperiled by loyalty oaths and
that any such impact on the educational system should be subjected
to close scruitiny. That three members of the Court should express
themselves so strongly indicated, as the Sweezy case "0 tended to
prove, that academic freedom will be given first amendment pro-
tection against impairment by state authorities. Perhaps even more
important is the Court's unanimous view that eligibility for public
employment can be conditioned only on requirements which have
a rational relationship to fitness. The Court is thus committed to a
review and assessment of state-imposed limitations on public em-
ployment. The extension of this requirement to state-imposed limi-
tations on private employment in Schware v. Board of Bar Exami-
ners 1 should not have been surprising.
B. Disqualification for private employment
In earlier days of occupational licensing, the Supreme Court re-
viewed state limitations which restricted occupational choice with
an erratic but recurring zeal. 28 The right of a citizen "to be free in
the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all law-
ful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by
126. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); see discussion accom-
panying notes 192-97 infra.
127. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
128. For example compare Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917) (invalidating
state law absolutely prohibiting private employment agencies), with Brazee v. Mich-
igan, 241 U.S. 340 (1916) (upholding state law imposing license fees on private
employment agencies and prohibiting them from sending applicants to an employer
who had not applied for labor).
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any lawful calling .... " 12 were among the rights protected against
state action by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
But even in these earlier days of judicial activism in the review of
state economic legislation, it was unquestioned that the states, in
order to protect the public, could impose reasonable restraints on a
citizen's freedom to choose his work." ° One facet of the "constitu-
tional renaissance" which followed the creation of a New Deal ma-
jority on the Court was the virtual abdication by the Court of
judicial review of state licensing statutes. 131 The states, it was said,
could regulate any occupation provided the regulation had some
reasonable basis in a public interest. Since a tenable argument can
be made in almost any case that the public health, welfare, safety,
or morals is adversely affected by "unfit" persons engaging in the
restricted work or by "unfair practices" which the regulation aims
to prevent, few occupational licensing statutes have been subjected
to successful constitutional attack. The Court's application of a pre-
sumption that conditions exist which support the legislative judg-
ment,132 and its refusal to inquire into legislative motives, have lim-
ited the scope of review to such a point that regulatory schemes
involving seemingly invidious discriminations have been upheld.' 3
129. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
130. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (upholding, 6--3, a state law
excluding persons convicted of a felony from the practice of medicine); Dent v.
West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (upholding a state law restricting the practice
of medicine to those satisfying state board of their qualifications).
131. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). In uphold-
ing an Oklahoma statute which (1) made it unlawful for any person not a licensed
optometrist or ophthamologist to fit lenses to the face or to duplicate or replace
lenses, except upon the written prescription of an Oklahoma-licensed optometrist or
ophthamologist; (2) subjected opticians to this regulatory system while exempting
all sellers of ready-to-wear glasses; (3) forbade the use of the premises of retail
stores by opticians; and (4) prohibited all advertising, the Court said:
The Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases.
But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and dis-
advantages of the new requirement. . . . [T]he law need not be in every
respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that
there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.
Id. at 487-88.
132. E.g., In Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S.
151 (1931), the Court stated that:
[Since the legislation] deals with a subject within the scope of the legislative
power, the presumption of constitutionality is to be indulged. . . . We cannot
assume that the Minnesota legislature did not have knowledge of conditions
supporting its judgment that the legislation was in the public interest, and it is
enough that, when the statute is read in the light of circumstances generally
known to attend the recovery of fire insurance losses, the possibility of a rational
basis for the legislative judgment is not excluded.
id. at 158-59.
183. E.g., Daniel v. Family See. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949) (upholding
a state statute forbidding life insurance companies and their agents from operating
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Unless Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners3' is based solely on the
fact that a former Communist was involved, it would seem to indi-
cate that the Court may re-enter the occupational licensing field
and strike down licensing requirements which have little or no
rational relation to fitness for the occupation in question.
Schware, after graduating from law school, petitioned the New
Mexico Board of Bar Examiners for permission to take the 1954 bar
examination. The Board, after a hearing, denied permission on the
ground that he had failed to show the good moral character required
by statute of applicants to the bar. The New Mexico Supreme Court
affirmed the denial, 35 and the Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Black, reversed.', 36 The Court concluded that the denial
offended due process because there was no evidence which ration-
ally justified the state's finding that Schware was morally unquali-
fied for the practice of law. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Jus-
tices Clark and Harlan, concurred on the ground that the state
court was unwarranted in concluding that Schwares past com-
munist affiliation made him "a person of questionable character."
The Schware case is significant in several respects. First, as noted
above, it indicates that freedom of occupational choice is an im-
portant freedom which is protected by the due process clause. The
Wieman case 37 established that public employment was not, a
"privilege" which could be denied for any reason whatsoever. Now
it appears that a similar protection is to be accorded to persons
arbitrarily excluded from the occupation of their choice. This is
neither an unfortunate nor an inappropriate development. The free-
dom to choose work of one's choice is surely a most important free-
dom, whether it be considered as "property" or 'liberty." The mush-
rooming of occupational restrictions in the United States, the in-
creasing tendency to allow regulated groups to control entry into
various occupations, and the growing irrelevancy to fitness of many
of the requirements that are imposed combine to greatly restrict
occupational freedom. 38 Perhaps it is time for the multiplying re-
an undertaking business and forbidding undertakers from serving as life insurance
agents; only one insurance company in the state operated on the basis of using
undertakers as its agents); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S.
552 (1947) (upholding, 5-4, a Louisiana river pilotage law under which incumbent
pilots had an unfettered discretion to select their successors, a discretion actually
exercised by choosing friends and relatives of the pilots).
134. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
135. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 60 N.M. 304, 291 P.2d 607 (1955).
136. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232. Mr. Justice W% hittaker did
not participate.
137. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
138. See generally GaLLonN, INDrvmuAL. Fanno.! AND Cov.eNm,,,-rA. RE-
sraAnT5 105-51 (1956).
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strictions on occupational choice to be subjected to the basic
requirements of decency and rationality emanating from the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The willingness, however, of the majority of the Court in the
Schware case to undertake an independent determination of the
facts presents larger difficulties. The case did not involve a legisla-
tive preclusion of a class of persons, as in Wieman, but a factual de-
termination that a particular individual did not meet an accepted
standard- good moral character. The New Mexico bar examiners
and the New Mexico Supreme Court had based their conclusion
that Schware had failed to show good moral character on Schware's
use of aliases, his record of arrests, and his past membership in the
Communist Party. The Court considered each of these factors in
detail and rejected each as rationally justifying the finding.
Schware had used aliases between 1938 and 1937 in order to
obtain work and to further his efforts as a labor organizer; his ar-
rests on various charges had been adequately explained and in each
instance the charges had been dropped; and he had been a member
of the Communist Party from 1932 to 1940, but had had no con-
nection with communist activities since that time. The Court con-
cluded that the use of aliases for a lawful purpose did not reflect
on moral character; that arrests without convictions were of slight
probative value; and that membership in the Communist Party
during a period when it was a lawful political party, absent any
showing that Schware was aware of possible illegal purposes or
participated in illegal acts, could not serve as the basis for a finding
of bad moral character, especially when the persuasive evidence of
present good character in the record was taken into account.
The air of reasonableness pervading the Court's opinion obscures
the fact that the Court made an independent assessment of the
facts on the basis of a reading of the record and rejected the de-
meanor evidence relied on by the trier of fact. Such a relatively
broad scope of review has hitherto been confined largely to coerced
confession cases. 139 The Court may feel that when such issues are
involved, public pressure and prejudice against minority groups
combine to decrease the ability of state courts to determine the facts
fairly. And the Court may have a similar fear when communists
are involved.
139. For three recent instances see Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958);
Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957);
cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 181 (1953); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S.
219 (1941). See also Berman, Supreme Court Review of State Court "'Findings of
Fact" in Certain Criminal Cases: The Fact-Law Dichotomy in a Narrow Area,
23 So. CAL. L. REv. 334 (1950).
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Of course, the absence of any evidence in a record to support an
essential finding of fact is itself a question of law. A finding without
a rational basis is an arbitrary and lawless finding, and subject to
attack as such under the due process clause. Whenever constitu-
tional issues are presented, the Court, in order to preserve its own
authority as the ultimate arbiter of such issues, must retain the pow-
er to look beyond the findings of the state court. But situations call-
ing for the exercise of this power should be rare. In the vast majority
of cases coming from state courts, the Court should and does give
deference to and follow the findings of fact of the state court.'~"
It is doubtful that the Schware case is one of those extraordinary
cases in which the Court should look beyond the factual determina-
tions of the state court. Demeanor evidence should play an impor-
tant part in determinations of moral character. The bar examiners,
as the triers of fact, were free to reject some or all of Schware's
self-serving testimony. It is for these reasons that the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Clark and
Harlan, is sounder in principle.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter read the opinion of the state court as
based primarily on its belief that "' one who has knowingly given
his loyalties to such a program and belief [communism] for six to
seven years during a period of responsible adulthood is a person of
questionable character."' 141 To draw an inference of present un-
suitability from the fact that a person had been a member of the
Communist Party fifteen years before, at a time when such member-
ship was not only lawful but fashionable, was "so dogmatic an infer-
ence as to be wholly unwarranted."'-' Although it was beyond the
function of the Court "to act as overseer of a particular result of the
procedure established by a particular State for admission to its
bar," 43 what the state had done, in effect, was to create an irrebuta-
ble presumption of bad moral character from the fact of past Com-
munist Party membership. This the due process clause prohibited.
C. A right to silence?
Observers of the onward march of security tests for public and
private employment have asserted with regret that the typical cas-
ualty of such measures is not a hardened Communist but a loyal
140. See, e.g., Stein v. New York, 846 U.S. 156, 181 (1953); Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443 (1953).
141. 353 U.S. at 250 (quoting from the state court's opinion).
142. Id. at 251.
143. Id. at 248.
1959] 1061
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
citizen with conscientious scruples."' Although this observation is
incapable of proof, it does seem likely that the net cast for subver-
sives has brought forth many innocent fish. Of course, if the security
measure invades the privacy of the conscience, the first amendment
may allow the individual to remain silent. 4 ' Religious inquiries are
the most obvious case, but similar protection may be accorded to
political beliefs and to academic discussion. The Sweezy case "I in-
dicates that inquiries concerning lawful political activities such as
those of the Progressive Party in 1948 and intellectual exchange such
as the academic discussion of socialism will be restricted. Even where
the first amendment provides no protection, the requirement that
membership or conduct have taken place with knowledge of un-
lawful purposes tends to protect the innocent. 47 Substantial dis-
qualifications cannot be predicated on mere guilt by association.
But these approaches may still be insufficient to protect the sincere
individual who refuses on principle to take an oath, sign an affidavit,
or cooperate in what he feels is an unjust and unlawful inquiry.""
The impact of security measures on the conscientious objector thus
raises the complex issue of whether there is a right to silence.
The problem has several dimensions. First, does the Constitution
entitle the conscientious objector to special treatment? On principle,
the answer seems clear. If the state has not invaded the area pro-
tected by the first amendment, and the measure in its general appli-
cation meets the requirements of the due process clause, the indi-
vidual who objects to it on grounds of conscience is entitled to no
more consideration than is received by those persons the legislature
sought to penalize. Second, there is the problem of what inferences
may be drawn from a refusal to cooperate. Most security measures do
not contain specific provisions for the noncooperative individual,
and the usual device has been to infer misconduct from a refusal
to answer relevant questions and even from a claim of the privilege
against self-incrimination. Is this permissible? Finally, there is the
144. GELLHORN, Tnm STATES AND SUBVERSION, 367-68 (1952); Byse, A Report
on the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 480, 482 n.5 (1953).
145. See the discussion at notes 172-97 infra.
146. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). See text accompanying
notes 85-97 supra.
147. See text accompanying and following note 137 supra.
148. Some states have taken the position that a refusal to answer questions
concerning communist activity warrants discharge even though the other evidence
in the record convinces the trier of fact that the person is loyal. Fitzgerald v.
Philadelphia, 376 Pa. 379, 102 A.2d 887 (1954) (dismissal of nurse for refusal
to take Pennsylvania's Pechan Act oath even though conceded to be "utterly opposed
to Communism and is in all respects loyal to the principles of our government");
Pickus v. Board of Educ., 9 Ill. 2d 559, 138 N.E. 2d 532 (1956) (dismissal without
hearing justified when teacher refused to take loyalty oath). Contra, Board of Educ.
v. Mass, 47 Cal. 2d 494, 304 P.2d 1015 (1956).
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problem of identifying the individual who is acting in good faith.
If security measures were drafted in such a fashion that a good
faith exercise of conscience would except an individual from their
application, this issue would be determined by state agencies in
the same manner as other factual issues. But existing security meas-
ures fail to make specific provision for the stubborn man of prin-
ciple. Yet there may be a judicial desire to exempt such an indi-
vidual from the general operation of loyalty tests. Important issues
of judicial review are raised when the Supreme Court makes inde-
pendent factual determinations of such ambiguous matters as "good
faith" or "good moral character."
The Court has not yet had a full opportunity to explore all of
these questions. Moreover, in those cases in which the questions
have arisen the Court has been bitterly divided. The absence of a
stable majority and recent changes in the personnel of the Court
make it likely that further change will take place. A survey of exist-
ing cases, however, may assist in isolating relevant factors and thus
provide an aid to predictability.
Questions involving the impact of governmental programs on the
individual who has refrained on moral or religious grounds from
complying with statutory requirements have often been before
the Court. The refusal to bear arms, for example, has been punished
by denial of citizenship,'49 denial of admission to the bar,' 90 and
imprisonment.151 Religious scruples, it has recently been held, are
not a defense to a charge of willful disobedience of an air raid
drill.152 But the Constitution may protect the nonconformist when
the governmental program does not represent a public interest to
which the Court assigns substantial value. Mr. Justice Jackson,
speaking for the Court in the second Flag Salute Case, M:' stated
broadly that the first amendment rendered a state powerless to com-
pel the affirmance of a belief -even the symbolic act of saluting
the United States flag.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to con-
149. The Supreme Court held prior to 1946 that an alien who refused to bear
arms would not be admitted to citizenship. United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636
(1931); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); United States v. Schwim-
mer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929). In Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946), the
earlier decisions were overruled.
150. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
151. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946); United States v. Kime, 188
F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1951); Richter v. United States, 181 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1950).
152. People v. Parilli, 1 Misc. 2d 201, 147 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Magis. Ct. 1955).
153. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), over-
ruling Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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fess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances
which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.' 5 4
Phrases of a similar nature may be found here and there in the
United States Reports, but usually as dicta not bearing the same
authority. During the early 1940's the Supreme Court was not
receptive, in general, to arguments predicated on considerations of
national unity. Only in the midst of the wartime crisis and the post-
war alarm did the Constitution, in the view of a majority of the
Court, find room for governmental coercion premised on an over-
riding need for national security.55 Absolutist pronouncements
concerning the ambit of first amendment freedoms gave way to
more flexible doctrine. Thus it was that the Court proved unrecep-
tive when a right to silence, usually said to emanate from the first
amendment, was urged in the earlier of the current series of cases
involving the application of loyalty tests to the recalcitrant wit-
ness.'"s More recent cases, however, have appeared to give an
uncertain degree of protection to this first amendment "liberty of
silence."
The first case bearing on the existence and dimensions of a "right
to silence -in this instance based on the due process clause -was
Slochower v. Board of Educ.,5 T involving the discharge of a public
school teacher following his claim of the privilege against self-
incrimination before a congressional committee. The Court held,
5-4, that a discharge predicated on the invocation of the fifth
amendment before a congressional committee violated the due
process clause. The majority opinion roundly condemns any imputa-
tion of guilt based on the use of the fifth amendment, and contains
broad language to the effect that the due process clause protects
any invocation of a constitutional right. Although the language
154. 319 U.S. at 642.
155. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American Communica-
tions Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944); Hirbayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
156. In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill. 2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826, appeal dismissed and cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 946 (1954); In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
The Anastaplo case, seemingly a clear case of a refusal to cooperate on grounds of
conscience, is discussed in London, Heresy and the Illinois Bar: The Application of
George Anastaplo for Admission, 12 Law. Guild Rev. 163 (1952); Note, Th Illinois
Bar and Individual Freedom, 50 Nw.U. L. Rxv. 94 (1955).
The Summers case involved a bar applicant who held pacifist views concerning
the use of force. The Supreme Court affirmed, 5-4, an Illinois decision denying his
admission on the sole ground that his religious views prevented him from swearing
in good faith to uphold the Constitution of Illinois, which contained a provision
requiring service in the state militia in time of war. The overruling of United States
v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), and United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644
(1929), both of which were relied on in Summers, by Girouard v. United States, 328
U.S. 61 (1946), undermined the authority of the Summers case.
157. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
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of the opinion suggested that a good faith refusal on constitutional
grounds to answer questions would be protected, the holding of the
case would appear to be more narrowly confined to its peculiar
facts.
Slochower, a professor with long experience and good record at
Brooklyn College, was suspended shortly after he had invoked the
fifth amendment before a Senate subcommittee. Section 903 of the
New York City charter made his dismissal automatic. Since the Sen-
ate inquiry at which Slochower invoked the privilege was not
directed to his fitness to hold a teaching position and the state had
not asked him for an explanation for his use of the privilege, the
Court was able to interpret the state action as based on an auto-
matic inference of guilt arising from the exercise of the constitu-
tional privilege. 5 Thus the case did not decide that a state cannot
discharge an employee for refusal to answer inquiries relevant to
his fitness directed to him by state officials.159 Nor did it decide that
a state cannot draw an inference from a failure of a state employee
to adequately explain the use of the privilege. It held merely that
due process forbids the arbitrary conclusion of guilt from the prop-
er claim of the privilege against self-incrimination in a federal
proceeding.
About a year later, when the Supreme Court decided Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 160 it appeared that the dicta of the Slochower opinion
had become constitutional doctrine. Konigsberg had been denied
admission to the California bar on the grounds that he had failed
to prove (1) that he did not advocate overthrow of the government
of the United States or of California by unconstitutional means,
and (2) that he was of good moral character. The record, which
contained testimonials from forty-two persons as to Konigsberg's
good character, also contained testimony that Konigsberg had at-
tended Communist Party meetings in 1941 and had written a vitri-
olic series of articles criticizing public officials and their policies.
Konigsberg answered the direct question, "Do you advocate over-
throw of the government of the United States or of this State by
force or violence or other unconstitutional means?" in the negative,
but refused on first amendment grounds to answer any other ques-
tions relating to his political beliefs and associations. The California
Supreme Court declined to review Konigsberg's petition, without
opinion,'" and, on certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed.
158. The dissenters, Justices Reed, Burton, Minton and Harlan, disputed this
interpretation of the New York City charter.
159. 350 U.S. at 558-59.
160. 353 U.S. 252 (1957). Mr. Justice Whittaker did not participate.
161. Id. at 254.
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Mr. Justice Black, speaking for a majority of five, reviewed the
record in detail, as he had done in Schware, and concluded that
there was no evidence rationally justifying the findings of the bar
examiners. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented on jurisdictional
grounds, urging that the case should be remanded to the state court
for a certification of the grounds of its declination to review. Mr.
Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Clark, dissented both on the
jurisdictional issue and on the merits.
The majority opinion of Mr. Justice Black comes very close to
holding that a state cannot draw unfavorable inferences from a
mistaken but honest refusal to answer relevant questions. While
intimating that it would be unconstitutional for admission to the
bar to be denied solely on the basis of a good faith refusal to answer,
decision of this issue was avoided with the explanation that Cali-
fornia had not based the denial on this ground. Yet this was done
only by ignoring the insistence placed on this matter by the bar
examiners and by finding, contrary to the implied finding of the
state, that the refusal to cooperate was in "good faith." Although the
majority did not question the state rule that the applicant has the
burden of proving his fitness, the decision must be interpreted either
as ignoring the burden of proof or as holding that the applicant
satisfies the burden by introducing testimonial letters with respect
to good moral character. In either event, the state is required to
produce affirmative evidence of present lack of moral character in
order to deny admission, and the lack of such evidence deprives the
finding of any rational basis and thus offends due process. The
applicant's refusal to cooperate, in this view, can be given little or
no significance.
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion I(2 demonstrates in con-
vincing fashion that the majority misconceived the question at issue.
The majority stated the issue as being whether the record contained
evidence establishing that Konigsberg bad a bad moral character.
His refusal to answer any questions, other than the general query
whether he advocated overthrow of government by unconstitutional
means, was treated as raising an entirely separate question, and,
since the state had not rested its denial of admission solely on that
ground, was given no significance whatsoever. Mr. Justice Harlan's
detailed analysis of the record, however, leaves little doubt that
Konigsberg's refusal to supply the bar examiners with the informa-
tion they needed to make a determination with respect to his moral
character was a crucial element in the examiners' decision that
Konigsberg had not carried his burden of proof.
162. Id. at 276-312.
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The implications of the Konigsberg case for the technique of
judicial review would be somewhat alarming if it were not for
the fact that subsequent decisions have greatly reduced its sig-
nificance.'63 As things now stand, the case evidences a willingness
on the part of some members of the Court to make independent
factual determinations from a printed record of such delicate mat-
ters as whether a person's refusal to answer questions was honest
even though mistaken. For the Konigsberg majority seems to be
saying that if an individual's refusal to cooperate is found-by a
majority of the Supreme Court-to be in good faith, and the
record does not contain other evidence which in itself warrants the
result reached by the state, the action of the state must be set
aside. 6 4 Thus Konigsberg is a much more far-reaching holding than
Schware,65 which holds only that a state cannot disqualify a person
from engaging in the occupation of his choice unless the basis for
disqualification has a rational relation to unfitness for the occupa-
tion.
The vicissitudes during the Supreme Court's 1957 term of the
163. See the discussion of the Beilan case note 166 infra and the Lerner case
note 169 infra.
164. Obviously the State could not draw unfavorable inferences as to his truth-
fulness, candor or his moral character in general if his refusal to answer was
based on a belief that the United States Constitution prohibited the type of
inquiries which the Committee was making. On the record before us, it is our
judgment that the inferences of bad moral character which the Committee
attempted to draw from Konigsberg's refusal to answer questions about his
political affliations and opinions are unwarranted.
353 U.S. at 270-71.
165. Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). It is doubtful that
either case will significantly reduce state control over admission to the bar. Con-
sider, for example, the later history of those applications for admission in which the
Supreme Court has become involved: (1) Anastaplo obtained a rehearing of his
application following the Konigsberg and Schware decisions. After lengthy hearings,
the Illinois Committee on Character and Fitness, b a vote of 11-6, again concluded
that the application should be denied because of Anastaplos continued refusal to
answer questions concerning membership in the Communist Party. It did so even
though it conceded that Anastaplo's loyalty and good faith were unquestioned. An
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court is now pending. (2) Konigsberg again refused
to answer questions concerning past or present membership in the Communist Party
after his case was remanded. The California Bar Examiners again rejected his appli-
cation, this time on the specific ground of failure to answer relevant questions. His
appeal is pending in the California Supreme Court. (3) Patterson's denial of admis-
sion by the Oregon Supreme Court was reversed and remanded for reconsideration in
light of the Konigsberg and Schware decisions. Application of Patterson, 210 Ore.
495, 302 P.2d 227, rev'd, 353 U.S. 952 (1957). On remand, the Oregon Supreme
Court reaffirmed its original opinion, relying on the fact that Patterson had been
a member of the Communist Party from 1946 to 1949 and must have been aware of
its unlawful objectives. 213 Ore. 398, 318 P.2d 907 (1957). The Supreme Court
then denied certiorari. 356 U.S. 947 (1958). (4) Schware apparently tired of the
long vigil and did not press his application after the Supreme Court decision in
his favor.
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right to silence which the Konigsberg case appeared to recognize
demonstrated once again the particularity with which constitu-
tional development takes place. In Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., I"
a public school teacher was discharged for "incompetency" after
many years of satisfactory service because of a 1953 refusal to an-
swer any questions put to him by his superior which related to past
membership in communist groups. The issue seemingly decided by
Konigsberg was cleanly posed: May a state discharge a person
solely on the basis of a refusal to answer relevant questions, or
is it necessary that there be other affirmative evidence of Lmfitness?
A differently constituted majority found the answer almost self-
evident-it was permissible for a state to draw an inference of
unfitness or lack of dependability from a refusal to answer rele-
vant questions.
The Beilan and Konigsberg cases seem to be incompatible in
principle as well as spirit. 67 The Court's opinion in Beilan at-
tempted to distinguish Konigsberg by stating that the action of the
state in Konigsberg "was not based on the mere refusal to answer
relevant questions -rather, it was based on inferences impermissi-
bly drawn from the refusal," whereas in Beilan "no inferences at all
were drawn from petitioner's refusal to answer."'" The refusal
itself operated to effectuate the discharge. This attempted distinc-
tion fails to penetrate beneath the surface of either case, treating
one as wholly a refusal-to-answer case and the other as an imper-
missible-inference case. Categorization as one or the other appears
to depend on nothing more than the verbal choices made by the
state court. Thus Konigsberg, although it remains as a case which a
future Court may build on, is reduced in import because its appli-
cation may be so easily avoided.
Lerner v. Casey, '6 a companion case to Beilan, dealt more di-
rectly with the inference that can permissibly be drawn from the
166. 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
167. It is significant that the three dissenters in Konigsberg were in the majority
in Beilan, along with Mr. Justice Burton (who was also in the majority in Konigs-
berg) and Mr. Justice Whittaker (who did not participate in Konigsberg). The four
dissenting justices in Beilan were all in the majority in Konigsberg. Since it is likely
that Justices Black and Douglas, and perhaps the Chief Justice as well, would have
preferred to take a more extreme position in Konigsberg, holding that questions
concerning political affiliation and belief are barred by the first amendment or are
irrelevant to fitness, it seems safe to assume that the more moderate position was
taken only to gain a majority for reversal. Since Mr. Justice Burton was the only
member of the Court who was in the majority in both cases, and his veto was
essential to each, it is possible that the cases represent his views. If so, his retirement
and the appointment of Mr. Justice Stewart may reopen the entire matter.
168. 357 U.S. at 409.
169. 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
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use of the privilege against self-incrimination. 70 Lerner, a New
York City subway conductor, was discharged by the Transit Author-
ity because of the doubt created as to his "reliability" by his claim
of the privilege against self-incrimination when asked by city of-
ficials concerning current membership in the Communist Party.
The Court held, again 5-4, that the inference of unreliability was
permissible. 1'7 The Slochower case was distinguished on the valid
grounds that Lerner had been questioned by state rather than
federal officers; that these officers had authority to ask questions
relating to subversive activity in connection with fitness for em-
ployment; and that the state had not made an inference of dis-
loyalty from use of the privilege, but only of "unreliability." The
Court also emphasized that the fifth amendment privilege was not
available to Lerner in a state investigation, and hence the state had
as much right to discharge him for failure to answer as it would
have had in the absence of a claim of privilege.
It should be noted that the questions put to Lerner related to
current rather than past membership in the Communist Party. If
a refusal to answer under such circumstances had not been treated
as permitting an inference of unfitness, the Court would have trav-
eled full circle, and the power of the states to exact information
relating to subversive activity from its employees, established in
the Garner case, would have become completely illusory.
While these decisions were rejecting, by narrow majorities, the
claim of a constitutional right of silence, other Supreme Court
decisions were creating such rights in wholesale fashion in some-
what different contexts. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 172
arising on peculiar facts, involves probably the most far-reaching
holding. The NAACP, a New York corporation, had failed to reg-
170. Beilan, like Slochower, had invoked the fifth amendment privilege before a
congressional committee, but unlike Sloehower, Beilan was purportedly dismissed
for failing to answer questions of a superior. Mr. Chief Justice Warren in his
dissenting opinion in Beilan argued that from a realistic standpoint the case was
indistinguishable from Slochower, since Beilan's dismissal took place only five days
after he had claimed the privilege before a congressional committee while his refusal
to answer his superiors occurred some thirteen months before.
The principal factual differences between Lerner and Beflan are (1) that the
former, but not the latter, relied on fifth amendment grounds in refusing to answer
his superiors; and (2) that Leamer was dismissed as a "security risk" while Beilan
was dismissed for "incompetency."
171. The Chief Justice and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan dissented in
three separate opinions. Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent argued that Pennsylvania in
Beilan and New York in Lerner had publicly labeled the respective petitioners as
disloyal Americans and that, if they were to be discharged under security statutes,
it should be through a procedure which avoided this stigma. Factually, this argument
seems stronger in Lerner than in Beilan. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's separate concur-
rence in both cases appears to be a reply to this argument.
172. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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ister under an Alabama statute requiring registration of foreign
corporations doing business in the state. In a proceeding brought
by the state to oust the NAACP from Alabama for failure to com-
ply, the NAACP was found in civil contempt and heavily fined for
failing to comply with an order granting the state's motion for pro-
duction by the NAACP of certain records, including its Alabama
membership lists. Ostensibly the state desired this information in
order to rebut the NAACP's claim, later abandoned, that it was not
doing business in the state for purposes of the statute. The Supreme
Court held that the state could not require the divulgence of the
membership lists, since it had not demonstrated any compelling
justification for compulsory disclosure.
The preliminary questions of jurisdiction' and standing174 need
not detain us, but the merits of the constitutional issue deserve
passing comment.175 Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion for a unanimous
Court proceeded step-by-step to its inexorable conclusion. First,
freedom of association -protected from state abridgment by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment - required that the
state action be scrutinized with care. Second, since divulgence of
membership would result in community pressures and reprisals,
compulsory disclosure would violate the rights of NAACP members
to freely associate in pursuit of their common beliefs. Third, Ala-
bama had no substantial interest in obtaining the membership lists.
This last conclusion was based on the fact that the NAACP had sup-
plied sufficient information so that the state could determine the
applicability of its foreign-corporation statute- the legal issue
to which the production order was directed."'
173. When the NAACP sought to stay the contempt judgment, the Alabama
Supreme Court denied the application, stating that certiorari was the proper
remedy. When certiorari was then brought, the Alabama Supreme Court hold that
mandamus was the proper remedy, and, alas, it was too late to file a petition for
mandamus. Ex parte NAACP, 265 Ala. 349, 91 So. 2d 214 (1956). The Supreme
Court held that this was not an adequate state ground and hence it had jurisdiction,
stating that "novelty in procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart
review in this Court applied for by those who, in justified reliance upon prior
decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal constitutional rights." 357
U.S. at 457-58.
174. The Court granted the NAACP standing to assert the constitutional rights
of its members. The members could assert the right to nondisclosure only by re-
vealing their membership; and there was a reasonable likelihood of substantial injury
to the organization. A similar standing question is discussed in several of the opin-
ions in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
175. The constitutional issues are discussed in Robison, Protection of Associations
From Compulsory Disclosure of Membership, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 614 (1958); Note,
State Control Over Political Organizations: First Amendment Checks on Powers of
Regulation, 66 YALE L.J. 545 (1957).
176. The Supreme Court may have difficulty enforcing its mandate. On remand,
the Supreme Court of Alabama reaffirmed the contempt judgment on the ground
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The NAACP case indicates that the Court is willing, at least in
the context of an organization seeking to uphold the rights of
Negroes, to protect group rights of association from the interpla)
of repressive private attitudes and state action compelling identi-
fication of the organization's members. And the right to prevent
disclosure will not be overridden by an argument that the informa-
tion is relevant to the determination of a question in which the
state has a proper interest The state must achieve its legitimate
purposes by the method having the least impact on first amend-
ment rights 1 7 7  in this case, from other information supplied by
the NAACP.
The grounds on which the Court distinguished New York ex rel.
Bryant v. Zimmerman- suggest the limitations which will be
placed on the NAACP case. In Bryant, a New York anti-Klan statute
had been upheld against the claim that compulsory disclosure of
members violated freedom of assembly. This holding was dis-
tinguished in two ways: the Klan, unlike the NAACP, had failed to
file any information with the New York authorities, and the New
York legislation was based on the fact that the Klan had engaged
in acts of unlawful intimidation and violence. But is a legislative
judgment that an organization has engaged in unlawful acts suf-
ficient to allow regulation of the organization by the technique of
disclosure? If so, allegations of unlawful barratry. champerty, and
maintenance would seem to justify regulation of the NAACP. In
the background, of course, is the attempt of the Court to enforce
its decisions in the School Segregation Cases."" Judicial notice of
social facts, a scanning of legislative motivation, and a more search-
ing review of legislative alternatives may be thought necessary in
this context.
that the NAACP had failed to comply with the order of production in respects
other than the membership lists. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 268 Ala. 531,
109 So. 2d 138. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari for the second time and
held that Alabama was precluded from claiming that the NAACP failed to comply
with the production order in other respects, since the state had not presented this
claim to the Supreme Court. Nor could the Alabama Supreme Court reemxamine the
grounds on which the Supreme Court had disposed of the case. 360 U.S. 240
(1959). The Court, following its usual practice, withheld the issuance of man-
damus on the assumption that the Alabama Supreme Court would enforce the
Court's decision.
177. There are many cases in which the Supreme Court has indicated that a
state must accomplish its purpose by the method having the least restrictive
abridgment.of first amendment rights. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1948); Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233 (1936). See Comment, Legislative Inquinj Into Political Activity: First
Amendment Immunity From Committee Interrogation, 65 YALE L.J. 1159, 1173-75
(1956).
178. 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
179. The campaign of many southern states to oust the NAACP and to require
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The Court's decision in Speiser v. Randall,80 involving the con-
stitutionality of a California statute conditioning the grant of a tax
exemption on the filing of a loyalty affidavit, confirms the preferred
position of first amendment rights and tends to support the right of
a private citizen to keep silent concerning his political beliefs and
associations- even if they are unlawful ones. California statutes
grant real estate tax exemptions to veterans and churches, among
others, but require every claimant for an exemption to sign a
statement on his tax return declaring that he does not advocate the
overthrow of government by unlawful means.""' The state court,
after construing the statutory requirement as extending only to ad-
vocacy which would constitute a criminal offense under state or
federal law, upheld the denial of tax exemptions to various veter-
ans and churches which refused to sign the loyalty affidavit. 18 2
Although the taxpayers had based their refusal to answer largely
upon first amendment grounds, the Court, in reversing, 8  held that
the procedure violated the due process clause in that the oath did
not conclusively establish the absence of improper advocacy, but
merely imposed upon the taxpayers rather than the state the burden
of proving nonadvocacy. Placing the burden on the taxpayers was
improper since an adverse determination would amount to a penalty
for the exercise of speech.
There can be little quarrel with the ultimate proposition that a
disclosure of its members is summarized in Robison, supra note 175, at 614-19. In
NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va.), prob. luris. noted sub nom., Har-
rison v. NAACP, 358 U.S. 807 (1958), a three-judge district court held that Vir-
ginia statutes aimed at the NAACP were unconstitutional and enjoined their
enforcement. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the ground that the
District Court should have abstained from deciding the constitutional issues until
the state courts had a reasonable opportunity to construe the statutes. Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959). The Court also reversed a contempt conviction
arising out of a Virginia legislative investigation directed at the NAACP. Scull v.
United States, 359 U.S. 344 (1959). See discussion supra at note 98. See also
NAACP v. Committee on Offenses Against the Administration of Justice, 199 Va.
665, 101 S.E.2d 631, dismissed as moot, 358 U.S. 40 (1958).
180. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). A companion case was decided the same day. First
Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958).
181. CAL. R-Ev. & TAx CODE § 32 (West 1954). The statute implements a pro-
vision of the state constitution. CAL. CoNsT. art. 20, § 19.
182. Speiser v. Randall, 48 Cal, 2d 903, 311 P.2d 546 (1957); First Unitarian
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 48 Cal. 2d 419, 311 P.2d 508 (1957).
183. The majority opinion in both cases was by Mr. Justice Brennan, who was
joined by Justices Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Harlan and Whittaker. The Chief
Justice did not participate; Mr. Justice Burton concurred in the result; Justices Black
and Douglas wrote concurring opinions dealing directly with the first amendment
issue; and Mr. Justice Clark, the lone dissenter, objected to the construction given
to the state statute by the majority, disagreed with its conclusion that the burden
of proof could not be placed on the taxpayers, and argued that in any event such
a position should not be taken in a case where the taxpayers had refused to take
the oath.
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state may not inflict a penalty without assuming the burden of
proof. Several troublesome points, however, must be disposed of
before this conclusion may be reached. First, the Courts holding
is premised on a dubious interpretation of uncertain California law.
The Court assumed that a local tax assessor could deny an exemp-
tion if he disbelieved a taxpayer's assertion of nonadvocacy in his
tax return; it also assumed that in a subsequent proceeding for a tax
refund the taxpayer would bear the burden of proof. The California
court had not passed on these questions, and statements in its opin-
ion cast doubt on the Court's interpretation of state law. 84 At best,
the ambiguity of state law warranted a remand to the state court
for clarification of the statutory procedure.
Second, it is difficult to understand why the taxpayers in this
case, who had refused to submit the required affidavits, were en-
titled to raise the constitutionality of a refund proceeding which
would never arise. The taxpayers had not been denied tax exemp-
tions on the ground on which the case was decided-failure to
carry the burden of proof in a refund proceeding. They had been
denied exemptions because they had refused to submit the required
affidavits. The taxpayers had not asserted their nonadvocacy, but
had refused to do so; the tax assessor had not been given the op-
portunity of accepting their assertions; and the burden of proof
in some hypothetical future refund proceeding had not been
litigated or determined by any California court. It seems doubtful
that the taxpayers had standing to raise the constitutionality of the
refund procedure on behalf of potential claimants who might never
exist. Yet the Court viewed them, in effect, as private attorneys-
general entitled to vindicate public rights threatened by require-
ments inhibiting free speech.8 5 Taken in conjunction with other
recent decisions, Speiser v. Randall supports the view that the Court
will not apply its usual doctrines of standing in cases involving free
speech issues.186
184. First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 48 CaL 2d 419, 432, 311
P.2d 508, 515-16 (1957). But c. id. at 480-31, 311 P.2d at 514-15.
185. The Court justified its consideration of the assessment and refund procedure
as follows:
The declaration required by § 32 is but a part of the probative process by
which the State seeks to determine which taxpayers fall into the proscribed
category. Thus the declaration cannot be regarded as having such independent
significance that failure to sign it precludes review of the validity of the pro-
cedure of which it is a part.
357 U.S. at 522-23. For authority the Court cited Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S.
313 (1958), which held that a person contesting the requirement that he obtain a
license before soliciting union members need not have sought such a license beforo
obtaining judicial review of its constitutionality.
186. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952);
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On the merits, the Court's decision is understandable only on the
theory that preferred constitutional status is given to first amend-
ment rights. For it would be unthinkable for the Court to conclude
at this late date that the burden of persuasion cannot constitution-
ally be placed on the taxpayer in ordinary assessment or refund pro-
ceedings. Only by viewing the denial of an exemption as a penal
sanction, requiring the safeguards of a criminal proceeding, could
this result be reached.8 7 While it is true that the economic conse-
quences of a denial of exemption from taxation and the imposition
of a tax are identical, it is ironic that the two should be treated alike
for purposes of the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech
and yet treated differently for purposes of the first amendment
guarantee of freedom of religion.188
The Speiser case is significant, however, not for the procedural
requirement imposed on refund proceedings, but for the doubt it
casts on the validity of any loyalty affidavit applying to the public
at large rather than specific groups which have been subjected tra-
ditionally to state regulation. The Court, in a dictum, was careful
to distinguish cases in which some important governmental inter-
est had justified inquiries into loyalty despite their incidental effect
on freedom of expression. 9
Each case concerned a limited class of persons in or aspiring to public
positions by virtue of which they could, if evilly motivated, create serious
danger to the public safety. The principal aim of those statutes was not
to penalize political beliefs but to deny positions to persons supposed to
be dangerous because the position might be misused to the detriment
of the public. The present legislation, however, can have no such justifica-
tion. It purports to deal directly with speech and the expression of political
ideas.190
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 11.S. 88.
96--98 (1940) (dictum). See 3 DAvis, ADMrmsITRATVE LAw TREATISE §§ 22.01-.18
(1958); Note, The Supreme Court and Standing To Sue, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 141
(1959).
187. The taxpayers, of course, were not subjected to imprisonment nor to in-
famy or the other collateral disabilities of a criminal conviction. But high standards
have been required of tax proceedings deemed to be essentially penal in character.
E.g., Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922). And a tax affecting first amendment
freedoms may be required to meet an even higher standard. Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). But cf. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22
(1953).
188. In the Speiser case the Court said that denial of a tax exemption could not
be justified on the ground that it is a "privilege" or "bounty." 357 U.S. at 518. But
compare Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1 (1950),
appeal dismissed for lack of a substantial federal question sub nom. Helsey v. County
of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956), in which a tax exemption for a religious school
was distinguished from a direct governmental payment. Justices Black and Frank-
furter dissented from the Court's action.
189. The cases distinguished were Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S.
716 (1951); Cerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951); American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
190. 357 U.S. at 527.
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Although the individual's right to silence may be subordinated to
the state's interest in insuring a loyal public service or regulating a
particular occupational group, the Court has now suggested that
it will not be subordinated when the purpose of the loyalty statute
is to penalize unlawful advocacy. If the state can impose criminal
penalties for unlawful advocacy, it is hard to see why it cannot
also impose civil disqualifications (provided, of course, that the
state assumes the burden of proof and provides the safeguards of a
full criminal trial). The deterrent effect on speech should be less
and the choice of sanctions is a matter for legislative judgment. To
this the Court has provided no answer. Perhaps the unexpressed
premise is that the Nelson decision precludes the states from im-
posing any form of penalty-civil or criminal-on unlawful ad-
vocacy of violent overthrow of government.1 91 Or perhaps a con-
cern for the conscientious individual who finds it distasteful to
pledge his loyalty underlies the Court's blunt warning. One surmises
that the difficulties of the Court's narrower procedural holding were
necessitated by its unwillingness to come to grips with this more
fundamental constitutional question.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire,92 previously discussed, 193 should also
be mentioned in the context of freedom to keep silent, for the opin-
ions in that case are permeated with windy oratory concerning
"academic freedom," liberty of "political expression," and "freedom
of association." Despite the lack of a majority opinion, six Justices
seem to be in agreement that any legislative inquiry concerning
words passed within academic precincts is presumptively invalid.
These expressions appear to be based on the following logic: ex-
posure of an individual's thoughts or beliefs inhibits free expression,
particularly if the ideas involved are unpopular ones; the first
amendment was intended to promote free expression; secrecy en-
courages uninhibited expression; ergo, there is a constitutional right
to remain silent. But this right, according to what appears to be
the majority sentiment, is not absolute; it must be weighed in each
case against the governmental interest in disclosure.
These views, if taken seriously, appear (1) to carve out a pre-
ferred area within the preferred freedom; (2) to create rights
which are based primarily on the harm disclosure causes to the gen-
eral community, rather than any harm done to the particular in-
dividual before the Court; and (3) to make the recognition of these
191. The Court in Speiser expressly reserved the question arising under the
Nelson case. 357 U.S. at 517 n.3. See discussion of this question accompanying notes
39-43, 45a-45d supra.
192. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
193. See part H supra.
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societal rights dependent on a failure of the government to show
that it has an overriding interest in disclosure. I should like to sug-
gest that the Court may become involved in serious difficulties if
it attempts to act on the basis of these grandiose pronouncements.
In the first place, the notion that talk between academicians is
of a higher order - and thus entitled to greater constitutional pro-
tection-than the conversations of the general citizenry is surely a
foolish one. "Academic freedom" has high value as a guild argu-
ment of teachers as a profession against their employers and as a
symbol of the scholar's ideal- the search for truth. But it has
never been thought that the employers of teachers (i.e., the trustees
of private institutions and the responsible heads of public institu-
tions) were precluded by the Constitution from inquiring as to
what goes on in the classroom or in passing on a teacher's qualifi-
cations on the basis of his conduct, writings, beliefs or any other
matter thought relevant to fitness. 94
It is something of an anomaly that the constitutional protection
of freedom of speech should prevent disclosure of speech. It is
even more of an anomaly that the existence of a constitutional
right should turn in large part upon the impact of compelled dis-
closure on the climate of free expression in the community rather
than upon the harm done to the individual before the Court. There
is room for legitimate disagreement of opinion in almost every
case as to whether disclosure inhibits expression or encourages it.
Just as full and honest disclosure in the marketing of securities is
thought to strengthen the operations of a free market, so it is argu-
194. Materials relating to "academic freedom," as well as exhaustivo citation
of the enormous literature, are contained in 2 EwamsoN & HAnmm, PoLITICAL AND
CrviL Ricn-rs IN THE UNITED STATES 972-1113 (2d ed. 1958). It has never boon
thought that the extensive state control over the qualifications of teachers, condi-
tions of employment, grounds for discharge, content of curriculum, and so on,
raised any constitutional problems whatsoever absent the most extremo circum-
stances of arbitrariness or discrimination. The few Supreme Court cases involvo
statutory requirements prohibiting the teaching of foreign Ianguages In private schools
(Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284
(1927)), or attempting to eliminate private schools entirely by requiring all children
to attend public schools (Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)). Public
school teachers have been dismissed because of pacifist beliefs during wartime,
McDowell v. Board of Educ., 104 Misc. 564, 172 N.Y. Supp. 590 (1918); State
ex rel. Schweitzer v. Turner, 19 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1944); for failure to engage in
war work, Reed v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 21 So. 2d 895 (La. App. 1945); for
working in a roadhouse after school hours and during the summer, Horosko v. School
Dist., 335 Pa. 369, 6 A.2d 866 (1939); for praising Russia and criticizing the
United States in the classroom, Board of Educ. v. Jewett, 21 Cal App. 2d 64, 68
P2d. 404 (1937); and for writing a letter, which was publicized, congratulating a
former student for failing to register with the draft, Joyce v. Board of Educ., 325
Ill. App. 543, 60 N.E.2d 431 (1945). And there seems to be no question but that
the grounds for discharge in private institutions are practically unlimited.
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able that disclosure of campaign contributions, registration of lobby-
ists and identification of the source of political literature will con-
tribute to free exchange of ideas195 Are these matters beyond the
realm of legislative judgment? And who can say whether disclosure
of a particular matter - favored by some, opposed by others -is an
unpopular idea which will inhibit expression or a popular idea
which will encourage discussion? Is it not even conceivable that
the unpopular idea will stimulate debate? A Court which attempts
to assess such imponderables has undertaken a task that it may not
be well equipped to handle. The magnitude of the difficulties casts
doubt on the logic which creates rights of such evanescent material.
And the difficulties in assessing the effects of disclosure on free
expression in the community are compounded by the equal difficul-
ties of balancing the result of that equation with the governmental
interest advanced by disclosure. Truly this is a task for the godsl
There can be no doubt that privacy is vital to a free society. But
this does not justify utilizing the first amendment to do the work
of the fourth and fifth.19° Is it not incongruous that the constitu-
tional provisions relating to privacy -the prohibition of unreason-
able searches and seizures and the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion-have been whittled away at the behest of governmental
"necessity," 197 while the first amendment has been utilized to pro-
195. The witness in the most insignificant civil trial is not accorded a privilege
with respect to his political opinions when they are relevant to the issues of the
case. 8 WIcMORE, EvmE~cE § 2214 (3d ed. 1940). Nor can a witness refuse to
testify because his disclosures may embarass him or his friends, cost him his job, or
expose him to social disapproval For the laws requiring disclosure of political af-
filiation, support, and contributions, see Nutting, Freedom of Silence: Constitutional
Protection Against Governmental Intrusions in Political Affairs, 47 MiciL L. Rv.
181, 204-06, 209-13 (1948). On the general problem of disclosure as a beneficent
policy, see WicINs, Fmm)om: OR SEcRECY 119-29 (1956); Wyzansk, The Open
Window and the Open Door, 35 CALw. L. REv. 336 (1947).
196. As has previously been noted, the fourth amendment prohibition of un-
reasonable searches and seizures and the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination are not applied with full vigor to the states. But most state constitu-
tions contain similar provisions. The pressure for a first amendment right to silence
arises out of two circumstances: (1) use of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is theoretically limited to situations in which the testimony would incriminate
the witness; and (2) a claim of the privilege may have significant collateral conse-
quences since it is often viewed as a confession of guilt. Ifa first amendment priv-
ilege not to reveal matters which the community feels it has a right to know is
created, it is likely that the same collateral consequences of social disapproval
would become associated with any claim of that privilege.
197. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), and United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), for niggardly construction of the fourth amend-
ment. And the Court has now held that a search warrant is unnecessary when the
search is for health inspection purposes. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
The ffth amendment has been held inapplicable to documents of an incrporated
or unincorporated association. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944);
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). And under the guise of a regula-
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tect the unspoken? The promise of the future is that we may live in
glass houses - silently I
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Although the federal interest in combatting communist subver-
sion is predominant, the states continue to possess concurrent legis-
lative power to protect a variety of state interests felt to be threat-
ened by communist activity. In particular, the loyalty of state
employees and of occupational groups in which the states have a
special interest, such as lawyers and teachers, is a legitimate matter
of state concern. Broader loyalty measures, however, which affect
the general public, are of questionable validity.
Pennsylvania v. Nelson,"' a dramatic instance of the displace-
ment of state law under the Supreme Court's pre-emption doctrine,
had a striking effect on state power to punish communist sedition.
But the states had been little interested in sedition prosecutions and
the decision has not been viewed as foreclosing state power in other
respects. While it is still possible that the Nelson case may be
interpreted so as to limit state power to investigate subversive ac-
tivity or to impose disqualifications on subversive persons, the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment (and through it the
first amendment) is the more significant limitation on state power.
Over the past decade the Supreme Court has been engaged in
a gradual refinement and particularization in a loyalty context of
the essential elements of due process. The largely procedural limita-
tions on state legislative investigations and loyalty programs which
have been evolved reduce somewhat the sweeping natural-law judg-
ment usually implicit in due process determinations and affords
some basis for predictability. Although the Court has expanded its
role of policing the minimal decencies of civilized government, it
is unrealistic to view these largely procedural limitations as serious-
ly curtailing state power. For the most part they merely put im-
portant limitations on the permissible ways of using the coercive
powers of government. Court enforcement of them may anger state
officials who feel they have acted fairly or irritate state court judges
whose determinations have been reversed. In the words of the
President's Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "they do
not have the effect of transferring activities from one governmental
tory program citizens may be required to keep records which are unprivileged
because they are "required." Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948): cf. United
States v. Kahriger, 845 U.S. 22 (1953). Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958)
and Mills v. Louisiana, 360 U.S. 230 (1959) illustrate the possibilities of forced self-
incrimination under the presently prevailing interpretation of the fifth amendment.
198. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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level to another. Nor do they prevent either level from pursuing
substantive programs of any kind likely to be adopted in this
country. 199
Some of the more important due process principles may be
generalized. If a state proves, or the individual admits, present
membership in the Communist Party or actual participation in
illegal activities, there is little doubt of the state's power to impose
civil disqualifications.200 However, when past membership is in-
volved the state must restrict its disqualification to situations in
which the membership was with knowledge of the illegal purposes
of the organization.20 And even knowing membership will not
serve as the basis for disqualification if that membership, since
terminated, occurred a number of years ago during a period when
the Communist Party was a lawful and recognized political party
in most of the states. 2 The opposite conclusion, permitting a state
to disqualify a person on the basis of such remote activities, is
thought to have little or no relevance to present fitness and to in-
volve the dangers of a bill of attainder in that it permanently dis-
qualifies, with no opportunity for rehabilitation." 3
Thus the teaching of the due process holdings is that the states
must provide adequate procedural safeguards if they desire to im-
pose substantial disqualifications on the basis of subversive activity.
Notice of charges, a fair hearing, representation by counsel, find-
ings based on substantial evidence (undue reliance on hearsay may
be precluded), and a reasoned exposition of the state's interest in
imposing the disqualification may well be required. If the state
has provided these safeguards and its courts have spelled out the
state's interest with clarity, the Supreme Court is likely to respect
it. As Allison Dunham has commented, the lesson of the Konigsberg
and Beilan cases is that old slogans and aphorisms cannot serve as a
substitute for adequate state procedure, careful consideration of all
constitutional claims, and a clear articulation of state policy.2"4
199. THE COMa'N ON IN-Govnmm MNTAL RELmATONS, A REPorr rO TIm PRESI-
DmT FOR TRANSMITTAL To THE CoNGRmSS 31 (1955).
200. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Board of Pub.
Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Cerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
201. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
202. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Exami-
ners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
203. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) '277 (1867); Ex parte Garland,
71 U.S. (4 WaIL) 333 (1867). See opinion of Mr. Justice Burton in Garner v.
Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 729 (1951) (separate opinion).
204. Dunham, The Role of the State Supreme Court in the Adjudication of Fed-
eral Questions, 8 U. OF CHm L. ScH. REc. 140, 142-43 (Spec. Supp. 1958). It
should be emphasized that uncertainties with respect to the content and meaning
of state law may be settled against the states when first amendment rights are in-
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The recent expansion of first amendment rights, however, consti-
tutes an exception to the general conclusion that the Court has been
respectful and accommodating to state policy. It is clear on the
one hand that the due process clause prevents a state from dis-
charging a public employee solely because of his claim of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination on a federal proceeding, 20 and on
the other that nothing in the Constitution precludes a state from
discharging a public employee who refuses to supply information
relevant to his fitness to his superiors. 2°0 But the possible existence
of a right to silence in some circumstances throws doubt on fur-
ther generalization. It seems likely that the following factors will
be given consideration: the degree of relevance of the questions
asked to present fitness; whether or not the inquiry is made by a
state officer and is concerned with the individual's fitness; the na-
ture of the proceeding in which the refusal takes place; the grounds
upon which the refusal to cooperate is based; and, finally, the other
evidence relating to fitness contained in the record. Other consid-
erations which may influence decision are the degree of severity of
the disqualification sought to be imposed, and the extent to which
procedural safeguards are provided before the imposition of the
disqualification. But the most important consideration, under recent
cases, is the impact of the statutory scheme on first amendment
rights and the countervailing governmental interest in disclosure.
In employment situations, the Court apparently feels that the
governmental interest in loyal employees outweighs the inhibiting
effect on freedom of expression and freedom of association. 07 In
the more general context of a loyalty program extending to the
citizenry at large, it seems likely that the state's interest will be over-
balanced by the considerations of free speech .20  The resolution of
intermediate situations remains unpredictable. Despite the absolu-
tist pronouncements of the Court concerning academic freedom, it
seems unlikely that the states will be foreclosed from investigating
volved. But the Court's decisions in this respect are not consistent except that a
majority refuses to remand the cases to the state courts no matter how uncertain
state law is. For example, in the cases discussed in this article state law was un-
clear in a substantial number. In some the Court gave great deference to a careful
exposition of state law by the state courts (Beilan and Lerner); in others it was will-
ing to construe state statutes on matters not yet passed upon by state courts (Garner
and Adler); and in still others it has rejected interpretations of unclear stato law
which would sustain constitutionality (Konigsberg and Speiser).
205. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
206. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958); Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357
U.S. 399 (1958).
207. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Board of Pub.
Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
208. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 527 (1958) (dictum).
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the loyalty or the classroom statements of professors at state uni-
versities. 0 9 The pulpit tone of many recent opinions, replete with
cavalier statements of breathtaking scope, merely encourages con-
troversy and confusion which more precise statement would dispel.
The emerging constitutional principles seem to be (1) that in-
nocent conduct must be distinguished from guilty conduct; (2)
that conduct in the past must be considered not as absolutely dis-
qualifying, but with respect to its relevance to present fitness; (8)
that imposition of substantial disqualifications is permissible only
when there is a substantial governmental interest in doing so and
adequate procedural safeguards are provided; (4) that beliefs will.
be distinguished from conduct; and (5) that conscientious re-
fusals to cooperate will be given an uncertain degree of protection.
These principles are an expansion of prior doctrine and evidence
a willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to take a more active
role in policing state attempts to impose disqualifications on sub-
versives. Yet the development thus far has not crippled state power.
Until recently, the Court avoided resting its decisions on the power
of the states to deal with issues of subversion and loyalty. Instead,
in addition to interpreting congressional action so as to displace
state authority, the Court used the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to enforce a strict procedural regularity. But
free speech considerations have bulked large in many cases, and the
Court at present seems more willing to predicate decisions on first
amendment grounds. If issues of subversion and loyalty continue
to be an important sphere of state concern, a further evolution of
constitutional doctrine is likely to occur.
The Court's performance in this difficult area has been marked
with a substantial degree of what appears to be confusion and in-
consistency. During the early 1950's the Court was inclined to
temporize. Finally, during the 1956 Term, it moved swiftly and
broadly to reassert individual rights as against governmental action
directed at subversion. But the majorities were slim and the mem-
bers of the Court did not often agree on the choice of doctrine for
reaching a particular result. The divisions within the Court and the
increasing sophistication of state courts in dealing with loyalty
cases have brought more difficult issues to the Court as time has
gone by. The resulting patchwork of decisions in 1958 and 1959
gives an impresion of vacillation and retreat which is probably mis-
209. It should be emphasized again that the Sweezj case did not involve the
power of a state to investigate the curriculum or personnel of a state university.
See note 88 supra. Investigations of state universities have uniformly been upheld
by state and federal courts. See cases cited in 2 E.iNmsoN & HABim, PoLrxcL AND
CrvL Pams IN THE UNTrED STATES 1108-12 (2d ed. 1958).
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leading. As has been pointed out above, there is a common core of
principle on which the Court is agreed. The inconsistency of deci-
sions- to some extent only apparent- is explained largely by two
factors: (1) the tendency of some members of the Court to engage
in absolutist pronouncements when they are given the opportunity
to write for the Court; and (2) a difference of attitude among mem-
bers of the Court concerning the nature and scope of judicial review
and the deference which should be given to other branches of
government.
Many members of the Court, of course, have been imbued
throughout the recent period with strong feelings of judicial self-
restraint and respect for the functioning of state legislatures and
state courts. These feelings are bound to become more influential as
the states treat issues of subversion and loyalty with greater care.
Thus federalist principles continue to be of great force in molding
constitutional development. If the observance of these principles
often lends an air of unreality (as in Beilan and Lerner) and formal-
ism (as in Uphaus) to some of the Court's opinions, it should be re-
membered that this may be the inevitable price of vigorous and re-
sponsible legislative bodies in this land of democracy.
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